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

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
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
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

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
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THE AESTHETICS OF PESSIMISM

JOHN STOKES ADAMS, JR.

A DISSERTATION
IN PHILOSOPHY

PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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INTRODUCTION

Of all the systems of the post-Kantian period, none in the last half-century has had greater extension or become more popular than the Schopenhauerian. Yet a part of this system—the Aesthetics,—appears to be excluded from this favor. It is, however, so integral a part of this philosophy that to every one who is at all informed in the matter this question must necessarily occur: Why, despite the vast secondary literature that has grown up around Schopenhauer, was just this part, so closely interwoven with the entire system of his philosophy, either considered as though it were a separate entity, or else not considered at all?

The ground of this neglect may first of all be found in the crisis which his pessimistic ethics—qua ethics—had precipitated among subsequent writers, which did not fail to have its influence on habits of thought in modern Europe and America, and which may have led to an overemphasis on that aspect of his system. Another ground may possibly consist in the many concessions and mitigations which he himself made in relation to his pessimism in favor of his aesthetics,—which may have tempted the commentators to suppose that the aesthetics, if worth considering at all, should be considered apart and alone.

With the first glance, however, that we throw upon his theory in regard to Beauty and Art, we notice how he appears to draw near to the concepts that penetrate human life and conduct. This tendency ultimately grows to such an extent that the most prejudiced interpreter cannot afford to ignore it.

It is not the principal aim of the present paper to expound the Schopenhauerian aesthetic; that has been done literally countless times (see bibliography in A. Fauconnet, "L'Esthétique de Schopenhauer"). Most of the efforts in this direction are scarcely more than summary collections of Schopenhauer's own statements, paraphrased for quick consumption; or else they are biased accounts written by enthusiastic furtherers of the "new science," unaware that it has any philosophical background whatever. Now, when considerable effort is being made to bring into cohesion as far as possible every derivation of Idealism and its opposite Realism, in order to aid in the endeavor to include their postulates

in a science of psychology, the exclusion—or the one-sided interpretation—of the Schopenhauerian Aesthetic is the more unjustifiable.

As for the more shining names among the commentators themselves, the converse appears: their very philosophic bias, however recondite, has been sufficient to cause omission of any sympathetic treatment of his philosophy of art. Even Lotze, in his work which appeared in 1868,¹ devoted but a few lines of appreciation to Schopenhauer as aesthetician. And of most of the others it should be said what Schopenhauer himself said of the Kantian commentators: "In einem heillosen Irrthum ist Der befangen, welcher vermeint, er könne Kants Philosophie aus den Darstellungen Anderer davon kennen lernen. Vielmehr muss ich vor dergleichen Relationen, zumal aus neuerer Zeit, ernstlich warnen: und gar in diesen allerletzten Jahren sind mir in Schriften der Hegelianer Darstellungen der Kantischen vorgekommen, die wirklich ins Fabelhafte gehen."² Elsewhere he has said, in effect: "If one reads my works, he may misunderstand me; if he reads my commentators, he is bound to misunderstand me twice." And yet this misunderstanding need not be willful. Bosanquet (*History of Aesthetic*, 2nd ed., 1904), after classing Schopenhauer with "exact" philosophers, admits that he is *prima facie* a mystic, and then asks us to remember that "the root of mysticism is a love of directness amounting to impatience, and a repugnance to the circuitous approaches of systematic thought."

The reputation of Schopenhauer by virtue of his aesthetics should stand or fall only insofar as it is closely involved in the absolute character of his pessimism. The result which we obtain in the one or the other case is of such importance that indeed the other elements of the Schopenhauerian system can be clarified only through it. The following paper undertakes to trace this relationship. It is distinctly to be understood that we are not attempting deliberately and captiously to confuse the realm of ethics with that of aesthetics. Such confusions are common enough nowadays, and have dire enough results. We are merely attempting to point out their necessary interrelations, in terms of the philosophic system of Arthur Schopenhauer. And if the reader can find no other use for this paper, "es kann, so gut wie viele andere, eine

¹ *Geschichte der Aesthetik in Deutschland* (Munich, 1868).

² Preface to the 2nd edition, "*Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*."

Luecke seiner Bibliothek ausfüllen, wo es sich, sauber gebunden, gewiss gut ausnehmen wird. Oder auch er kann es seiner gelehrten Freundin auf die Toilette, oder den Theetisch legen. Oder endlich er kann ja, was gewiss das Beste von Allem ist und ich besonders rathe, es recensiren."³

³ Preface to the 1st edition, "*Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*."

I

Barely two hundred years ago, aesthetics as now known and defined had not yet raised its head among the family of disciplines formally collected under the name of philosophy. The world-view prevalent in the eighteenth century was dualistic. The cleavage between God and the world was, in life as well as in philosophy, general. At the beginning of the nineteenth century a decisive trend toward monism set in, which at the outset embraced philosophy, and thence reached out to and dominated the other realms of spiritual life. Philosophy, then, following the customary explanation of world genesis, turned back to the concept of the oneness of the universe, to Nature, and to the organization of the world entity; along with the intellectual, there developed also an intuitive world view, and for aesthetic pleasures objective significance became the factor of measurement, and this objective significance came to be considered relatively to the object in its connection with the world plan. The aesthetic impulse did not restrict its influence to the form or the exposition thereof but extended even to the heart of matters universal. The new school based its philosophy not only upon logical proofs but also upon the direct effect, consequent on an intuitive view of a complete synthesis. The goal of this philosophy was to conceive Nature as a whole, and to understand the identity of her workings in the multiplicity of her forms.

Thus reflections upon the beautiful and the "aesthetic" were raised from a science of lower rank until they came to form an integral part of philosophy. From this situation the schools drew much profit. Their opinion was authoritative in all philosophical considerations concerning beauty; and not only the measure of aesthetic pleasures but the grounds thereof were sought outside of man and, at times, in zones far remote from him. Under the influence of this view of beauty in its relation to the world, Schopenhauer wrote his Aesthetics.

As to his philosophical antecedents, there were three main influences. First, in theory, Schopenhauer starts with Kant, whose conception of the "thing-in-itself" he identifies with a basic *will*

which, as the ultimate reality, can never be known in itself, but only in its "objectivations." The will is too irrational to be an object of knowledge, but its objectivations, being specific and external types of existence, may be known. The second influence is Plato, for these objective stages of the will's expressiveness are the Platonic Ideas. The third influence is the ancient Vedanta philosophy, the common doctrinal basis of all Hinduism, in which Schopenhauer had thoroughly steeped himself.

According to his definition, works of art are the product of genius wherein ideas, born of quiet, painless (that is, will-less) contemplation, illustrate the essential and the enduring among all the appearances of the phenomenal world.

Out of this definition, in which Schopenhauer determines the philosophical significance of aesthetics in its relation to the universe, there come the basic lines of his metaphysics of the Beautiful, as well as many important impulses of our understanding, at least in the sense that a more precise consideration of the relationships of our understanding is encouraged.

The average man,¹ "diese Fabrikwaare der Natur" as Schopenhauer was accustomed to say, who everywhere in the toil and moil of vulgar existence seeks only what is useful to his will, subsumes in understanding every conception or perception, and with mighty haste grasps after ideas, as the indolent man a chair, in order as quickly as possible to find a resting place. Genius, on the other hand, preempts the *object* that lies at the bottom of his perception, from the whirlpool and the tumult of life, from the stream of the world current² to which it belongs; he isolates it from the relations of space, of time, of causality and of its own individuality (since the object, in all its relations to our will is considered from our viewpoint only as the dim appearance of the concept presented),³ and then sinks completely in its existence. As it is detached thus from its individuality, all struggle and suffering cease⁴—and it may be conceived of in a sort of quiet, painless and

¹ Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, vol. I, pp. 254-255. All subsequent references to this work are to the edition of Schopenhauer's collected works edited by Eduard Grisebach and published by Philipp Reclam.

² Ibid., vol. I, pp. 251-252.

³ Ibid., vol. II, pp. 439-440.

will-less contemplation;⁵ and then, by means of artistic technique there is depicted the Idea, the adequate objectivation of the Will, the essential theme of Art.⁶

The history of mankind, the multiplicity of successive events, the calamities of so many centuries, are but transitory manifestations of ideas, independent of space, time and causality.⁷ These ideas have the unique faculty that they can become in their presentation the object of the subject,⁸ and may themselves, within the province of the individual, constitute objects of cognition. The number of the individual entities, wherein single factors of the will's objectivation may find their expression, is immaterial.⁹ The most tremendous number of individuals cannot exhaust the content of the will nor diminish it. It is the origin and the basis of individuals as well as of ideas.

If our perception through the body, which as an object among other objects is liable to the laws of space, of time and of causality, were not *directed*, then our knowledge would not embody oneness, diversity, multiplicity, alteration, etc., but would consist in Ideas exclusively,—i.e. adequate objectivations of the will at a given stage. In the Idea, comprehended through painless and quiet contemplation, there is united the perceiving subject with the picture of the object viewed. The object of the contemplating subject is his representation, and if he be wholly submerged therein, then that representation ceases wholly, because his entire consciousness is none other than the most distinct picture of the object viewed.¹⁰ Subject and object then have become one. Every intermediate member between subject and object has vanished; the subject, become entirely spirit, sees the eternal reality of Ideas, and by them comprehends the divine principle of the will's negation—to be sure only for a short moment, just so long as the object of the idea presents fleetingly the object of art to his eye. The

⁵ Ibid., vol. I, p. 365.

⁶ Ibid., vol. II, pp. 435-438.

⁷ Ibid., vol. I, pp. 333-334.

⁸ Ibid., vol. I, pp. 248-249.

⁹ Ibid., vol. I, p. 240. "Sie (die Idee) hat bloss die untergeordneten Formen der Erscheinung, welche alle wir unter dem Satze vom Grunde begreifen, abgelegt, oder vielmehr ist nicht in sie eingegangen: aber die erste u. allgemeinste Form hat sie Beibehalten, die der Vorstellung überhaupt, des Objektseins für ein Subjekt."

¹⁰ Ibid., vol. I, pp. 184-185.

¹¹ Ibid., vol. I, pp. 243-244.

fact that a man who is still encompassed in the individuation (principle can obtain a foretaste of bliss by means of aesthetic contemplation is for him an imperative urge to turn this fleeting perception of joy into a lasting one. How Schopenhauer, even in his Aesthetics, involuntarily throws himself into the moving waters of his ethics!

The relationship between the body and its head¹¹ expresses most eloquently the difference between the condition in which the reason stands with the intellect still subordinate to the will, and that in which it rises superior to the will and is freed from its supremacy, even though for a short time. The will bows the head of the subhuman animal to the earth, where it finds the means for its sustenance; in the case of man, however, the body touches the earth, but the head is raised, proud and free, gazing into the distance; it projects above the shoulders, and no longer seems to be the absolute servant of the body. "Diesen menschlichen Vorzug stellt im höchsten Grade der Apoll von Belvedere dar; das weit umher blickende Haupt des Musengottes steht so frei auf den Schultern, dass er dem Leibe ganz entwunden, der Sorge für ihn nicht mehr unterthan erscheint." The artist does not perceive beauty inductively through experience; he anticipates it, free from all restraint, by giving a clear, pure expression of an Idea. He removes every contingency from it, and lets us peer with his eyes into the universe itself.¹² The essence of art and beauty, accordingly, consists in the painless condition of pure perception, freed from all the fetters of the will.

The mainspring of this process is the Idea; it is the exclusive aim of Art, the sole source of those works of art which outlast all time. In life, understanding is indispensable; in art, however, it is unprofitable.¹³ Therefore the true artist can give no accounting for the objectives of his work.¹⁴ The inarticulateness of the first-class artist, in matters concerning the goals and the implications of his art, is too familiar to require comment. The exceptions to this—men such as Leonardo, Rodin, Maeterlinck, Wagner—can be numbered on the fingers of a hand. But the inferior artist, in

¹¹ *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 243.

¹² *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 264.

¹³ *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 312.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 313.

his art, is motivated by understanding. He notes what is wanting to the art work, retouches and abstracts, brings it into harmony with a concept, and then appraises it. Such an inferior artist, says Schopenhauer,¹⁵ resembles the polyp that bears the color of its food, a machine that mixes and breaks the objects thrown into it, although the single different particles of that mixture can always be separated from one another. Genius, on the other hand, is a living organism that continually assimilates and creates. Its existence involves¹⁶ a special faculty of contemplation, of withdrawing its intellect from the will, of immortalizing whatever among phenomenal occurrences the days may *pro tempore* bring into being. Upon these rules, here very briefly epitomized and restated, Schopenhauer's Aesthetics depends—a starting point for the task of merging Kant's "Ding an sich" and Plato's Ideas in his own hypothesis of the Will.

Artistic and aesthetic perception is, according to this teaching, nothing but will-less perception; all formal qualities, which relate to the modes of such perception and thus to art and artists individually, are but secondary and casual. Through the mere silence of the will in the subject, the object immediately becomes the representation of the Idea. The essential thing is that the perception shall master the will and rise above it, even though only for a moment.¹⁷

"Hier liegt auch die Analogie und sogar Verwandtschaft desselben mit der am Ende des folgenden Buches dargestellten Verneinung des Willens" (W.a.W.u.V, volume II, page 422) "In dem Menschen also kann der Wille zum völligen Selbstbewusstsein, zum deutlichen und erschöpfenden Erkennen seines eigenen Wesens, wie es sich in der ganzen Welt abspiegelt, gelangen. Aus dem wirklichen Vorhandensein dieses Grades von Erkenntnis geht, wie wir im vorigen Buche sahen, die Kunst hervor. Am ende unserer ganzen Betrachtung wird sich aber auch ergeben, dass durch dieselbe Erkenntnis, indem der Wille sie auf sich selbst bezieht, eine Aufhebung und Selbstverneinung desselben in seiner vollkom-

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 313.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 263.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 424-425. This subject, as Will and therefore as individual is exclusively "The One," and this gives him abundant opportunity to act and to suffer. As a purely objective portrayer he is the pure subject of cognition, in whose consciousness alone the objective world has its existence: as such he embodies all things in himself.

mensten Erscheinung möglich ist." (W.a.W.u.V., volume I, page 339.)

In this way the aesthetic phenomenon enters into relationship with the ethical. (For it depends, in all its various forms, upon a negation of the will.) This relationship of the aesthetic with the ethical is quite obvious to Schopenhauer, and, in this respect at least, his Aesthetics is not distinguishable from certain other precedent theories of beauty and of art.¹⁸ Art and Morality are what man is accustomed to regard as the aim of Mankind; not that one may accept two wholly independent, noncohesive and entirely different aims, but that one, as between these aims, seeks a higher negation. It is clear that however badly morality and art harmonize with each other, at one point they must touch. On one side stands the manifest humility which has existed in our entire inner life since the morning of time and shall continue for all eternity, flowing from a higher Power who, in exercising an all-embracing wisdom, has engraved on our hearts obedience to principles: on the other side stands the pleasing self-confidence with which each of us perceives the discoveries of the highest exercise of human reason. Both views, however at variance they may seem, agree in that they arise from one aim—whether implanted by a higher Being or achieved by man himself, an aim with which our views and perceptions have harmonized or will harmonize. What corresponds to it shall be; what does not correspond to it shall not be; it is supported by the entire spiritual life of man, not only in the realm of right and justice and the applications thereof, but also in the sense of art, along with everything that he may evolve in its name. After this exposition of the relationship between art and ethics, many general impulses in art may be elucidated. Schiller says in his articles on naïve and sentimental poetry¹⁹ that it is odd how few traces we find among the ancient Greeks of the sentimental interest that we associate with scenes and characters in nature. This observation he later expanded into a declaration that the Greeks were wanting generally in a sense of natural beauty. This is not the place to consider the justice of this statement, but certainly the extant antique works of plastic

¹⁸ Herbart also links aesthetics with practical philosophy or ethics.

¹⁹ Miscellaneous writings, p. 123, Schiller's collected works, vol. XII, edition of Philipp Reclam.

art do not exemplify natural scenic beauty; the splendid human forms in their character as illustrations of ethical and religious thoughts determined the character of the art far more than did the pleasure that flows from the beauties of surrounding nature. The relationship between art and ethics also makes it clear why the art of one period harmonizes with the needs of that time. Thus we find that in the old heroic days, when the strength of the individual ranked in the foreground, the objects and situations constituting the themes of the painter or the poet were entirely different from those of later times when the development of the notion of the State led to the restriction of the individual. There we have the employment of strength, of courage, of wisdom, inspiring the poet to artistic effort; later came the utilitarian subjects of civic virtue and love of Fatherland; while again in the old theocracy, submission to God was the object of the poet's aspirations. When the ethical-religious ideas of a period of development were so strengthened that they seemed no longer to need the furthering aid of art, and when, on the other hand, the artistic sense, thrusting upward in its growth, always pressed on to new activities,—only then could the pure sense of Beauty possibly take the leading place.

In order to ascertain at what point art and ethics meet, we must ask what are the aims of art; the answer to this will be, according to one of Schopenhauer's greatest compatriots, substantially as follows:

The aim of a work of art is to bring the pure harmony of our feeling to our perceptions, to lead the sweet-sounding measures of our experience through the soul, and to purify our powers by the sensed and known past that is completing itself before us. For the fulfillment of his high destiny man must raise the human spirit above sensual enjoyment to the point where Morality may serve it as the tool of Art.²⁰

Construing this statement most broadly, Schiller does not conceive that morality will be furthered immediately by art, for he knew fully that art, if she desired to follow such aims, would have to consider her own worth and effect; he knew at the same

²⁰ This statement, which appears several times in Schiller's prose works, is restated in general form in the small articles "Ueber aesthetische Erziehung des Menschen," and in a number of letters.

time, however, that all art-work that is important in itself, lights a holy spark in man, and, therefore, has a moral,—an ennobling or—better,—an ethical, effect. Yet he does assume that such effects might be desired of art. Goethe says very appropriately in this connection, in the twelfth volume of "Dichtung und Wahrheit": A good work of art can and will indeed have moral results, but to demand moral aims from the artist is tantamount to spoiling his handiwork.

Art in Schiller's view, should therefore have the task of aiding morality to a victory over sin; in Schopenhauer's interpretation, however, the aim of art would lie in its unconscious results; for art leads us away from things, from our will's relations with them and from our own reality, and vouchsafes us that silence of the impulses which when permanently rounded out, is a condition of holiness and of redemption.

A psychological explanation of aesthetic pleasures is nowhere to be found in Schopenhauer's discussions. "Mit einem Kunstwerke," says Schopenhauer,²¹ "muss man sich verhalten wie mit einem grossen Herrn, nämlich sich davor hinstellen und warten, dass er einem etwas sage." While he was living in Italy he would often come under the influence of such thoughts, filled with the heavenly rest brought to his soul by seeing imperishable works of art which meant surcease from the promptings of the Will. He himself declared that in such moments, as though at the behest of a magic wand, all the turbulence of desire and all the storm of emotions ceased. Yet, despite this excess of aesthetic effect, he did not pay much attention in his Aesthetics to those factors of our life's feelings within the province of which our comprehension develops an appreciation of aesthetic pleasures; he did not reveal to us the *source* whence comes the warmth of participation, by which our spirit is moved to a feeling of aesthetic delight at the sight of every work of art. The distinctions which he makes in this connection refer rather to the external form, and to the different modes of cognition. The basis and the origin of aesthetic experience he concealed in the depths of metaphysics, and transferred the solution of the question from the psychological to the metaphysical realm.

He who reflects upon the aesthetic dissociates his object from

²¹ MSS. fragments, Reclam edition, vol. IV, p. 265.

all ties that link it closely to life's appearances; he makes it a representative of a class whose sole member it is, and views every relationship in terms of his own person. And while he views the thing as the object of his pure cognition he himself unconsciously develops into a subject of pure cognition as he becomes isolated from his own individuality. The reward won here is a fugitive glance into the Universe, into the secret ways of a mysterious Final Cause, without whose objectivation the beauty of ideas remains forever unknown to the heart of man. Schopenhauer believes he has realized what Kant had declared to be unattainable with our discursive understanding. The *Ding an sich* is now no "caput mortuum"; the problem is solved, the sphinx has tumbled from its height. From the great chain fashioned by the myriad rings of the objectivated Will, we may let ourselves sink into secret depths whose elucidation and exploration, according to Kant, lies beyond the limits of human comprehension.

As Schopenhauer demolished the limits of the individual Being with the aesthetic consideration, he created new relationships within as well as without; so that he felt himself called upon, on the one hand, to determine the effects flowing from the objectivated Will in the organization of our spiritual life; and on the other hand, to clarify the status of these effects outside, in respect of the objects they have evoked.

Frauenstädt (*Aesthetische Fragen*, 1863), Schopenhauer's earliest critic, saw the corner-stone of the Schopenhauerian Aesthetic; yet, despite his analysis he was not successful in doing other than to classify the more obvious modes of aesthetic pleasure.

The individual ceases with the individual willing, and Willlessness, upon the heights of pure knowledge, need give no account of the origin of that bliss which only the willing individual desired, and which a will-less intellect cannot enjoy; and if Schopenhauer insisted on the painlessness of a will-less intellect which is nevertheless capable of enjoying aesthetic pleasure, it was only a consequence of his theory of the negation of desire.

"Wenn Schopenhauer," says Eduard Hartmann,²² "den Gemüths-zustand beim künstlerischen oder wissenschaftlichen Empfangen oder Produzieren als blosse Schmerzlosigkeit bestimmen konnte, so muss er wohl nie den Zustand der Extase oder Verückung

²² Philosophie des Unbewussten. Berlin edition (1869), p. 584.

kennen gelernt haben, in den man über ein Kunstwerk oder eine um sich aufthuende Sphäre der Wissenschaft gerathen kann. Wenn er aber die Positivität eines solchen Zustandes des höchsten Genusses eigesehen hätte, so hätte er nicht mehr behaupten können, es dabei mit einem willensfreien und interesselosen Zustande zu thun zu haben, sondern er hätte eingesehen, dass es der Zustand höchster, vollkommener Befriedigung sei und Befriedigung wesen, wenn nicht eines Willens."

If Schopenhauer desired therefore to measure the effect of the aesthetic "Erscheinung," he should first of all have evoked the energy of our will so as to explain the ecstasy that results from union with the object of contemplation, which summons it up in proportion to its own sublimity. And then he certainly would not have found in the stillness of peace, or in the condition of painlessness, that highest degree of delight which we experience through the exhibition of works of art. He would then have admitted that beauty is vested in the object. One does not desire it because it is a means for the attainment of ideas and aims that lie beyond, or merely because of its own ingenuity, but because one wishes to join with it in one's perceptions. Perceptions, when they involve sensations of pleasure, do not encourage separation; liberated from separating obstacles, they return anew to more perception and observation.—This, in summary, was his theory of the Beautiful.

Without going further into the subject, it is clear that the third volume of "Die Welt als Wille und Anschauung" is dominated by two major thoughts, which are the key to an understanding of this work. One consists in the dissociating of the relationships that obtain between reason and will; the other in the exposition of the relationship between the Platonic Ideas and the Will. The former determines the function of our intellect in relation to the anticipation and exposition of the beautiful, the latter sets forth the Platonic elements that Schopenhauer had incorporated into his aesthetics.

That Schopenhauer in his philosophy of art found not a little support in Plato's charmingly poetic theory of Ideas, is seen in his insistence on the consolation man merits in his efforts to break out of the bitter impasses and the blind alleys of life's difficulties. Driven about in restless struggles, he sought many times to explain life as endurable only through the enjoyment which art—i.e. truly

disinterested art,—may give to man, "durch das ruhige Sonnenlicht, das kein Sturm erschüttert und das den Sturm durchschneidet."

Schopenhauer's friends and followers made several interesting attempts, not always successful, to clarify the Platonic elements which vaguely cohered with his system; this probably was done because they had been convinced that the entire Schopenhauerian art philosophy was manifestly dependent on the Platonic Ideas, and that the value of that contribution which Schopenhauer has made in his metaphysics of the beautiful may only be established in the framework of his philosophical system as an essential correlative thereof. We consider it necessary, therefore, before entering into detail in regard to the Aesthetics of Schopenhauer, to touch upon his ideology, which, with a brief recapitulation of his metaphysics, will be the burden of the following section.

II

The final result of the Kantian Philosophy—so disparaging to the human intellect, and yet in the highest degree so rich in subsequent effects,—was that we are able to recognize only the appearances of things (phenomena), and not the thing in itself (noumenon). The idealism of Fichte, the identity theory of Schiller, and Hegelian absolutism owe their origin to this principle. While these different systems strove with one another for supremacy, and that of Hegel had achieved an almost general acceptance, Schopenhauer, virtually in silence, had "thought out to the end" the great thought of Kant; as he often boasted, he lifted the veil with which that "Thing-in-Itself" had closed our spiritual vision.

"In dieser Welt der Dinge," said Schopenhauer²³ "und Körper lagen vor mir zwei Dinge, beide waren Körper, schwer, regelmässig geformt, schön anzusehen. Das eine war eine Vase von Jaspis mit goldenem Rand und Henkeln, das andere war ein Organismus, ein Thier, ein Mensch. Nachdem ich beide genügsam von Aussen bewundert hätte, bat ich den Genius, der mich begleitet, nun auch mich in ihr Inneres eindringen zu lassen. Es geschah. In der Vase fand ich nichts vor, als den Drang der Schwere und einige dumpfe Sehnsucht, die sich als chemische Verwandschaft auss-

²³ MSS. fragments, vol. IV, pp. 97-98. Reclam edition.

prach. Als ich aber in das andere Ding gedrungen war, wie soll ich mein Staunen aussprechen über das, was ich dort gewährte! übertrifft es doch an Unglaublichkeit alle jene ersonnene Märchen und Fabeln: doch will ich es erzählen, auf die Gefahr hin, keinen Glauben zu finden. In diesem Dinge also, vielmehr in dessen oberem Ende, Kopf genannt, welches von Aussen gesehen ein Ding wie alle anderen im Raume begrenzt, schwer u.s.w. ist, fand ich nichts geringeres vor mir, als eben die ganze Welt selbst, mit samt der ganzen Zeit, in der sich das alles bewegt, nebst allen, endlich was beide füllt in seiner ganzen Buntschäckigkeit und Zahllosigkeit: ja was das Tollste, mich selbst fand ich darin herumspazierend."

Here we have the major principle of the Schopenhauerian philosophy, in an eccentric though highly felicitous word-picture.

The world is my idea, and the idea of every being that thinks, feels and perceives as I do. The constants and the necessary conditions of the real world depend upon my reason, which, while that of lower beings slumbers, has in me arisen to the capacity for apprehension. My mind is the seat of the Universe, and I myself with the conception of the world formed by that mind, am but a tarrying appearance of the Universe, an individual among other individuals with whom I have in common the origin and aim of Being.

The constant laws of physics, the necessities of all organic metamorphoses, are but single rings or links of that chain that binds them and me to a common, invisible, unknowable Final Cause—to an indeterminate Ultimate,—with logical certitude and unalterable necessity. The Will is the "thing in itself," hence the only original, the only primary thing; the Intellect is appearance, the secondary thing, which has arisen to the highest degree of objectivation. All philosophers, Schopenhauer says, have erred when they accept the intellect as having primacy; *after* the intellect they place the will—this inner, true, indestructible Being of man, which, however, is itself unknowing. They regard the essence of mind as thought,—they call man a thinking being, a "rational animal." This ancient error must be abolished. The *will* is the one persistent vital force; the intellect may at times *appear* to lead it, but only as a guide leads his master, or as a feeble and lame old man who can see directs a strong blind man who can walk and is

carrying the other upon his shoulders. No! the will is the first, the intellect the second. The will is metaphysical, the intellect is physical, a product of the brain. The will, which in all beings remains the same (while the intellect, not only among different existences but also among men themselves, shows a great difference and gradation), is to man the thing-in-itself; by our recognition of it, we recognize by analogy the world also as Will; the things, including our very bodies into which the will enters and objectifies itself, are only perceived by our idea and form the world as idea. Now the will (i.e., the unconscious will undirected by understanding) remains the unalterable element in all things, and objectifies itself step by step according to the principle of individuation; and the world of appearance, in ranks and ranks of existences passes from the great heavenly bodies down to man, in whom the Intellect, as the luminary of the Will, attains its highest development, and enters our conception, and flits about just as though it were the True, the eternal Being. Thus falls the veil of Maja before our eyes and conceals from us the true existence of Things.

Reason therefore is not an independent principle; it is a secondary and diverted power, a suitable means which an unknown greater power—the boundless Will,—uses in order to give effect to its functionings: "Sie ist die Brille, durch welche der Wille die Dinge betrachtet."

This position of the intellect in relation to the will is a logical consequence of the Schopenhauerian system, as appears from innumerable statements, and in the clearest manner, from the chapters on "vergleichende Anatomie" and plant physiology. And, incidentally, it may be remarked that when Hartmann in his "Philosophie des Unbewussten" does not specifically relate the intellect to the will in this way, he thereby sets himself in opposition to Schopenhauer, not only as to this point, but also as to the entire system.

Logic seems to require that the monistic world principle shall remain, and that it shall not permit the creation of anything different from itself; accordingly, such a creation in a monistic world is in the fullest sense quite impossible. Hence the conclusion seems necessary that the intellect must have something will-like in itself; indeed, that if it come to be a world principle, it can really be only a specific sort of will. But the will may not be so

anathematized as to become a servant, even to itself,—else it would not be will. Yet we notice, at times, a good deal is required of this intellect, and at special moments it can shake off this yoke of will. One cannot then ascribe to the intellect the faculty of being able to raise itself above the will; one certainly cannot grant to the intellect, by reason of its ability to evoke aesthetic will-less contemplation, that high station mentioned by Schopenhauer in his reference to Spinoza's words:²⁴ "Mens aeterna est quatenus res sub aeternitatis specie concipit." How then shall this servant, the intellect, escape from its sovereign, the will? Schopenhauer answers, "Through the power of the spirit,"—and that by this he should mean such a power as the dogmatic schools would mean, is an interpretation that could not be accorded to any philosopher who might boast of being the true successor to the Kantian throne. We understand here only an energy dwelling within the brain, which consequently is nothing else but a higher grade of the will's objectivation; thus, the intellect, supplied with this energy, is always bound together with the will. Unless, of course, we wish to assume, along with Koeber (*Die Philosophie Schopenhauers*), that at this grade of objectivation the will has ceased,—has gone on a vacation, so to speak. Yet how can this be? For we can indeed imagine that the will-to-be has ceased; but that it has ceased to desire, and yet despite this still exists, is utterly unthinkable. Further, with such a prying loose of the intellect from the will, indeed some will must still subsist. Hugo Gaudig, in his "*Grundprinzipien der Aesthetik Schopenhauers*," sets this forth in three postulates, in which he reminds us that will *must* be attributed to the pure will-less subject of aesthetic contemplation. One had almost assumed a contrary notion, against Schopenhauer's own clearly expressed opinion of the undivided will.

The will then is dominated by two impulses: a general and very simple one, aiming at the maintenance of the individual; and another, higher, aesthetical,—philosophical. This will, thus dominated by two impulses, might be asserted also, independently of the postulates mentioned by Gaudig, as the logical consequence of the relation of the intellect to the will, and hence of monism. The contrary relation between the intellect and the will must be refuted by logic, as suggested above. Logic brings into the picture a sense

²⁴ *Ethica*, part V, prop. 31.

of oneness; it must narrow the connection between intellect and will,—indeed, in a certain sense it must make it over into an identity. Hence it would follow that the *willing* Intellect always must keep identity within itself, and that all of its aims are engaged also in the existence of the World Will, irrespective of whether directed toward self-maintenance and forward development, or toward apprehension of ideas and of the universe of things. As an important consequence it appears to follow that the intellect, necessarily to the extent that it is a separate mode of will, is no longer a means but is a separate end in itself. This obscure relation of the intellect becomes still more portentous as one becomes aware that Schopenhauer has supplied his will concept with no content, and therefore, by dissection and analysis of his system, a cleavage has been discovered in what was to him a unitarian will. This was first pointed out by Chalemel Lacour in his critique of the Schopenhauerian Philosophy.²⁵

"Gesetzt," says Schopenhauer,²⁶ "es würde uns einmal ein deutlicher Blick in das Reich der Möglichkeit und über alle Ketten der Ursachen und Wirkungen gestattet, es träte der Erdgeist hervor und zeigte uns in einem Bilde die vortrefflichsten Individuen, Welterleuchter und Helden, die der Zufall vor der Zeit ihrer Wirksamkeit zerstört hat, die grossen Begebenheiten, welche die Weltgeschichte geändert und Perioden der höchsten Cultur und Aufklärung herbeigeführt hätten, die aber das blinde Ungefähr, der unbedeutendste Zufall bei ihrer Entstehung hemmte, endlich die herrlichen Kräfte grosser Individuen, welche ganze Weltalter befruchtet haben würden, die sie aber durch Irrthum oder Leidenschaft geleitet oder durch Notwendigkeit gezwungen an unwürdigen, unfruchtbaren Gegenständen nutzlos verschwenden-sähen wir das alles, wir würden schavdern und wehklagen über die verlorne Schätze, ganzer Weltalter. Aber der Erdgeist würde lächeln und sagen: 'die Quelle, aus der Individuen und Kräfte fliessen, ist unerschöpflich und unendlich wie Zeit und Raum; denn jene sind ebenso wie diese Formen aller Erscheinung, Sichtbarkeit des Willens. Jene unendliche Quelle kann kein endliches Maass erschöpfen: daher steht jeder im Keime erstickten Begebenheit oder jedem

²⁵ *Revue des deux Mondes*, 1870. "Un Boudhiste Contemporain en Allemagne Arthur Schopenhauer."

²⁶ *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, vol. I, p. 250.

Werk zur Weiderkehr der Weg noch immer offen. In dieser Welt der Erscheinungen ist so wenig wahrer Verlust als wahrer Gewinn möglich. Der Wille allein ist, er die Quelle aller jener Erscheinungen."

From this inexhaustible source come also the aesthetic ideas that Schopenhauer had set on the threshold of knowledge; yet without the background of the will, the reason cannot alone avail itself of them for the purposes of Art. Schopenhauer sees in Ideas nothing but the mechanical expressions of an unknown and incomprehensible world substance.

Plato sought in Ideas a medium between an intellectual world and our understanding, between the Heraclitean flux, or consistent change in things, and the one, eternal and infinite Being; Schopenhauer's Ideas are a medium for the objectivation of an incomprehensible Final Cause; they are to him a means by which his Aesthetics may become a clamp that holds together his *Weltanschauung*. Now we can see why Schopenhauer employs the will in explaining the genesis of ideas; and here comes the "Ding an sich." Yet right here a difficulty arises, which Schopenhauer himself mentions, that as soon as we have recognized the "Ding an sich" and it has penetrated the intellect, straightway it ceases to be because it is hampered by the element of Time. Consequently the will cannot possibly be the true "Ding an sich," although it at least remains a vision, or appearance, whereby the existence of this world comes to be expressed in the clearest and most distinct manner. Only with this limitation can we understand Schopenhauer's statement: der Wille ist das Ding an sich. The "Ding an sich" (which is never an object, precisely because every object, already appearance, is no longer itself, and must, to be thought of objectively, borrow names from one of its appearances), in order to be able to serve as a point of understanding, may, as among all appearances the most complete, be illuminated indirectly by the understanding alone; and this function is wrapped up in man's will. The "Ding an sich," accordingly in the true sense of the phrase, is unknowable, because the object of the subject can only be an appearance; an appearance, however, cannot offer any true knowledge free of subjective coloring, because it would be furnished with our subjective and conceptual forms of Space, of Time, and of Causality. Schopenhauer differentiates,

therefore,—in order to go further than Kant,—between the subjective concept of appearances and an objective concept, quite independent of the subject; some concepts thus are subordinated to all forms of our understanding, and to the principle of sufficient reason; the others have but the one form—object of the subject, to become the object of the understanding. The Ideas therefore cannot, with Schopenhauer, occupy the same position that is given them by Plato's theory.

To this difference of position Lehmann makes reference in his work on the Schopenhauerian Philosophy (*Die verschiedenartigen Elemente der Schop.*, Willenslehre, 1889); he traces, however, this difference back to other grounds; in effect, he says: As Plato appropriated the Heraclitean theory of the eternal flux of things and the Eleatic theory of the eternal Being, at the outset he divided the world into two parts—here the world of ideas, there the world of things, each in a relation of absolute contrast to the other. A division quite as decisive between Realism and Idealism had been established by the Kantian distinction between the "Ding an sich" and "Erscheinung," except that Kant had designated the Ideal as the "X" of our comprehension. Schopenhauer had seen in this Ideal, this "X," the Will as *ἐν καὶ πᾶν*; consequently for him the rubric of Idealism, which with Plato included the Idea, was fulfilled. The Ideas, with Schopenhauer, had to be subordinated. Whereas with Plato, the Ideas, as the absolute Being, are opposed to the thing, as partially Being and partially Not-Being, Schopenhauer could not maintain this position. There was nothing left for him to do but interpolate between the *Ding an sich* and *Erscheinung*.

Lehmann failed to observe, however, that with this status of ideas, the dualistic mode of ideas is not tenable. According to Schopenhauer, ideas are, in fact, of two sorts: ideas of natural powers and ideas of organic existence. If, however, ideas are a reality as between the *Ding an sich* and *Erscheinung*, then they pass to the second kind of ideas, to the typical forms, which the organic development in its creative powers directs, and in whose formation the artistic cooperation of the first sort of ideas—the natural powers—is needed. To Plato ideas serve as archetypes, and single things strive to equal them; Schopenhauer's ideas represent as units a myriad of real things,—they are the forms of

the Will, which as the Being of the World manifests continually a higher and higher rank. Plato's Ideas are principles, of all true knowledge, of all being; their dialectic sequence has its goal in the notion of Godhead; Schopenhauer's Ideas are disconnected, single, original forms,—single species; for with him there is in the world no particular illuminating or directing aim, which attracts and dominates the Will-to-Live; the Will-to-Live is without objective, is without any regard to the value of life, and is without any conception of a purpose.

After distinguishing these differences between the Ideas of Plato and those of Schopenhauer (excepting those of which Schopenhauer himself was aware, and which Gaudig mentions), it becomes immediately clear that Schopenhauer really had not borrowed the Ideas but their technique. In fact, he did this in order to have a basis for his Aesthetics; otherwise, one might suppose, there could be no aesthetical standpoint for the consequent pessimism. If the Will in itself is worthy of negation, if its total manifestations in the world of appearance are repugnant and objectionable, how then can its appearance be beautiful? It is seen, accordingly, why Schopenhauer insisted on the necessity of incorporating the theory of the Platonic Idea in his aesthetics; he did this because he required a metaphysical clamp between the Will, the existence of the World, and the ever-increasing Appearances. Plato's Ideas would not have brought us to the goal; for Plato's Ideas are quite self-supporting; they are clear Beings, and although they are subsumed under the concept of Godhead as the highest idea, yet this signifies nothing in the sense that all ideas are dependent upon the idea of God,—it is, rather, a *primus inter pares*. If, however, the ideas, (according to the interpretation of Lehmann, above mentioned) be dependent on the will, in Schopenhauer's view of it, they would, indeed, be but the medium whereby the *Ding an sich* is manifested, and, therefore, is known.

The examples given by Schopenhauer in his Aesthetics explain clearly the incidental significance that the Platonic ideas had with him. Where the theory of the archetypes suited him, he followed with joy the footsteps of that "edlen und grossen Geistes"; but where the way became too narrow for him, he declared himself decisively against Plato. In this connection we learn also from him that the man who exposes himself to art comprehends the beautiful

a posteriori, because he himself amounts to an objectivation of the will, just as the genius possesses the faculty to comprehend ideas, because these are manifestations of the same will that is present also in him; or as one might say: "Haec omnes creaturae in totum ego sum et praeter me aliud ens non est."²⁷

This contention of Schopenhauer's was, in spite of its historical respectability (for it traces its ancestry through Kant to Spinoza, through Spinoza to Plato and the Oriental Vedanta) the subject of severe censure by Herbart in his Critique of the Schopenhauerian Philosophy. But this did not swerve him from his insistence on the subordinated status of the intellect in respect of the comprehension and exposition of the Beautiful.

III

Schopenhauer repeated several times that the aim of art is the presentation of the Idea. Since, however, ideas themselves are but the objectivation of the will, which here in this world presses for release, so also the presentation of ideas can only be a presentation of some stage of the will on the pathway to release. Accordingly, art has a second metaphysical side. Sculpture, painting, poetry in general have as their task the representation of the ideas of man; and thus there is seen in sculpture the representation of the Will to Live, in painting its negation, and in poetry, finally,—as the highest demonstration of the Idea of man,—the representation of yea-saying and nay-saying; the measurement of the comedy of yea-saying and the tragedy of nay-saying.²⁸

Let us first consider sculpture. This dedicates its productive powers to the entire human form. According to Schopenhauer, the whole body represents a kind of sinfulness, the negation of which elevates man. Therefore the demonstration of this body, mostly in partially or wholly naked form, without the faculty of giving the countenance an expression of negation, as the painter is able to do, can only express the Will to life,—whence it is clear to him that sculpture was the one proper medium of expression in primitive times.

"In der Sculptur bleibt Schönheit und Grazie die Hauptsache. Der eigentliche Charakter des Geistes hervortretend in Affect,

²⁷ Oupnekhat I, 122, quoted by Schopenhauer.

²⁸ Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, vol. II, p. 514.

Leidenschaft, Wechselspiel des Erkennens und Wollens, durch den Ausdruck der Geistes und der Geberde allein darstellbar, ist vorzüglich Eigenthum der Malerei."²⁹ The ethical impulses in sculpture occupy a low plane. It is the representation of the idea of the man, and thus the forms which it brings into being must wear a merely generic character.³⁰ Yet for that reason it does not wholly exclude the individual. The true beauty of the single forms of sculpture consists, of course, in the representation of the generic character of all men, and yet with a properly signalized individuality;³¹ and so it is in agreement with this notion that the works of ancient plastic art represent the highest execution of this field of art, since its forms, though essentially typical, are yet individual enough to show the beauty of man from another side. The artist does not create this generic beauty with individual coloring in any empirical way, but he *anticipates* it, as it were; and Schopenhauer refers to the Greeks, who most assuredly in their representations of the beauty of the human form did not at all proceed in empirical and inductive ways by considering the most splendid human bodies from all parts of the world! The artist, according to Schopenhauer, expresses most clearly what Nature says rudely, and as often as he invests the marble with the form of beauty, he calls to Nature, "das war es, was du sagen wolltest."

In order to motivate Schopenhauer's viewpoint in respect of idealism, let us cast a glance on the historical sequence of idealisms in German aesthetics to the period when Weisse and Vischer, through the introduction of the dialectical method, brought to a plausible conclusion all of the gains made in combination with the idealism of Schopenhauer.

Before Kant had undertaken to found the propriety of aesthetic idealism scientifically, the tendency in aesthetics was seen in the school of Baumgarten, which sought beauty in confusion, with all of the spiritual agitation of our minds depicted in the art work. By this, the feeling of the beautiful is not yet a fully developed and conscious idea, and represents still an incomplete illustration and an unclear conception.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 301.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 299-300.

³¹ *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 666.

Winckelmann sought to answer the question by reference to the factors that lend to beauty its inexplicable power over our minds. In doing this he included all the Arts in a final unity of the beautiful, and established this class of beauty as an incomplete picture of the highest beauty.

Lessing claimed that art idealizes the forms which Nature cannot develop because of the opposition of matter and the unfavorable influences of the outside world.

Kant, in his studies of the beautiful, does not proceed beyond a determinate object confronting us, but he begins his studies from the subjective side. He does not declare what beauty is, but he dissects our judgment of taste in order to ascertain the conditions of beauty. According to Kant, beauty consists in the harmonious consonance of our soul's powers; and only this part of Kant's aesthetics had any importance for Schopenhauer, although he intertwined some other Kantian matter with his theories of the conditions of pure will-less knowledge.

In the post-Kantian period, the science of feeling expanded into a world view, and the mere activities of the human spirit up to that time proved to be inadequate to the task of providing a background for perfected ideals.

Schelling makes the metaphysics of beauty the central point of his philosophy. In the mythological world he found the sum of the spiritual life expressed, and considered this to be the highest and most worthy activity of art. The ideal of the ancients was a symbol of inclusion—the Finite enclosing the Infinite. Christianity represented symbolically the Infinite; the Finite possesses its meaning only so far as it gives expression to the Infinite.

Solger's living beauty is in "die Phantasie"; in the historical development of beauty, he places in contradistinction to one another the Christian allegory and the symbolism of the ancient classics, according to the different spiritual tendencies of each period.

Hegel conceives of beauty, the material appearance of the eternal and infinite thought content, as having an evolution analogous to the absolute Idea. The symbolic, classic and romantic art forms are parallel expressions for the meaning of the natural, the god-like and the human, both in religions and in Weltanschauungen." The symbolic art of the Orient *sought* the ideal oneness of exist-

ence and of form, the Greeks found it, and the art of the Romans, in later times, *superseded* it.

Weisse sets forth his ideal as consisting in the historical effects of the "folk-spirit" and the general activity of the creative imagination raised to the height of a world contemplation. The ancient ideal placed in contradistinction the spiritual life of the individual and the actual historical events of the world and the activities of the people. Romanticism then reconciled the warriors of light and of darkness in the ideal of Love. The resultant modern ideal is the keystone in the pursuit of Justice and Godliness.

With Schopenhauer "das Antizipieren des Schönen" is the ideal. This ideal of anticipation of beauty is very *generally* grasped, and allows great variety of various interpretation, since the "Something" developed by the artist, serving him as well for form as for law, is not once even approximately alleged; therefore, it appears to isolate itself from all of the periods mentioned.

The metaphysical side of Painting appears much more clearly, for here Schopenhauer speaks of negation, as such,—above all, in the sacred pictures of the Christian churches. They show in their form the elements of all *willing*, they show the strivings and the turnings of the Will and, with it, the entire existence whence comes release; in the countenances of the angels and of the holy beings these pictures exemplify a wondrous affirmation of the holiness of the Final Goal to be attained of all men: The Negation. And therefore for Schopenhauer painting appears to be the negation of the Will,—looking at painting mainly as the churchly art of the Middle Ages. The final summit for Schopenhauer is the great painting of Italy, and in this summit he finds at the same time the climax of all knowledge, and draws near in a certain sense to the teachings of Christianity. After painting has followed the Will through all of its developments, from that lowest rank where the primal causes are developed, up to the highest where one finds the state of grace, the great Italian masters take their last step in their knowledge of Art; from out of their sacred pictures shines the light of that final knowledge of Philosophy; in complete peace of Will they ring out the last act of life.

IV

Poetry was the next art to absorb the attention and engage the action of man, and this, according to Schopenhauer, it can the

more easily do because it does not have to show the outside form of man, but the inner man only. The medium by which it completes its task cannot catch a single moment of the life of man as in the plastic arts, but it may limn the existence of man as it is manifested through an entire series of events separated in time and space, illuminated from all sides in the clearest manner.³² Poetry also, more than all other Arts, may teach man that any happiness whatsoever is of a merely negative nature. "Jede epische oder dramatische Dichtung," says Schopenhauer "kann immer nur ein Ringen und Kämpfen um Glück, nie aber das bleibende und vollendete Glück selbst darstellen."³³ One sort of poetry, i.e. tragedy, has the advantage that it can lead more easily than all other arts to the highest consolation, through the tragic emotions it evokes, not only for the poet himself, not only for the genius, but also for the onlooker,³⁴—and that is the knowledge of the negation of the Will, the one completely consoling thought. Thus the ethical impulse stands out in his theory of the tragedy, more than in all other Arts, and reaffirms, in fact, his whole pessimistic ethics.

The technique of tragedy, according to Schopenhauer, is to propel the heroes into frightful struggles and plunge them into immeasurable woe; but precisely these sufferings reveal to them the nature of the world, and enable them besides to sense the nothingness of all life on earth, and teach them to deny the Will,—an act which leads to release or redemption. While in this way tragedies present an example of the sufferings of the world, they awaken not only in the hero but also in the onlooker the consciousness of true existence, and bring to him also, in the paths the hero wanders, the notion of acting rightly;³⁵ and this inner urge to seek the paths that lead to redemption is exactly what constitutes the feeling of the tragic. What the hero atones for is indeed inherited sin, in the deepest sense, the guilt of existence itself,—and tragedy is the clearest reminder of the fact that life is an oppressive dream,³⁶ out of which we have to awaken. The hero in the tragedy suffers, because suffering is the way of the world.

³² *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 323.

³³ *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 415.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 336.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 510.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 510-511.

It teaches us the one truth that we must suffer for the wrong of being born. Here we may see the difference between the Schopenhauerian and the Grecian and Christian tragedies. The Grecian tragedies showed how an impenetrable fate or an unreasoned decision from a higher power may weight man with woe; and tragedy lay in the fact that, in spite of everything, man had an overpowering determination to bring this calamity upon himself, and by virtue of his own deeds even to anticipate it. One later learns that the sufferings of the hero under the pressure of this longing for this blow of fate were not quite so tragic and laughable. In the new tragedies, therefore, the guilt was depicted as a collateral thing, that which by right belongs to fatality. The tragedies did not exercise their destruction upon the obviously bad and evil; the fear and the sorrow in the tragedy lay in the inability of man to discover an errorless way in the conflict of duty,—to give effect to an idea without injuring another who might take revenge. The reconciliation the tragedy offers is in the consciousness of the restoration of a reasonable world order, of the worth of the personal spirit and the frailty thereof, which, after the sacrifice of man's finiteness, shall pass on to the predestined end. We see, according to this view, the heroes struggling for the highest destiny, devoted to purposes of the highest and most moral kind. This evokes our compassion, for we suffer in sinful nature with the hero; but our respect for moral laws is established, and this elevates our moral nature.

Schopenhauer, who really scoffed at "the categorical imperative" wherever he mentions it, lets the heroes of tragedy suffer, as we have seen, because sufferings are the law of life; in resignation he saw the utmost result of all art, and so he tended to minimize the craftsmanship³⁷ in the tragedies of the ancients who in the representative arts are perhaps still our masters.

In the view of Aristotle the aim of tragedy is to evoke fear and pity, and properly cleanse our souls of them; Schopenhauer acknowledged this, yet not as the real man of tragedy but merely as the means,³⁸ so as to lead to resignation. Thus the hero dies in the tragedy after he has struggled and suffered before our eyes—not to evoke compassion but to be our teacher; the hero

³⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 510.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 511.

has fought as an important character under the impulse of powerful motives, and when cunning or a bad accident brought him low, he died defenceless, although without the desire to have the means of defence, because all motives had led to the nullification of the will. So he died guiltless; yet his death is no expiation of his wrong, but is the result of his having lived. In such heroes we see the tragedy of mankind repeated; as one writer on tragedies said: "their situation is the cross-section of universal existence become visible."³⁹ Tragedy represents not so much the hero renouncing his individual rights and the ethical priority of his position; it represents his sufferings. And in so doing, it becomes a confirmation of the real world; it should convince us more than ever of the worthlessness of life, and make us freer than ever of the Will. Hamlet, the "Steadfast Prince" of Calderon, the Bride of Messina, all die lamented and purged by their pain and suffering (*Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, volume I, pages 334-335). Upon the heights of knowledge the veil is lifted, and with silent resignation they are ushered out of life.

This entire theory (Schopenhauer himself draws attention to it),⁴⁰ is set forth most clearly by Voltaire in the voice of the dying Palmira, as he calls out: "Mahomet, the world is for tyrants;—Live thou!"

Despite all this, one may by no means assume that Schopenhauer would not have set himself the task of describing the human characters in tragedies; rather, he recognized that in tragedies and in dramas generally, human characters, even in the utmost depths, merit poetic representation in their analysis; yet he wishes that in tragedy the greatest misfortune be considered not as something arising from rare circumstances, or as the acts of monstrous characters, but as something arising from the character of man, naturally proceeding from him, because then only the prescribed result—to move the onlooker to resignation—can be attained. We wish, therefore, in the following to clarify what Schopenhauer understood by character, and in so doing we shall touch upon an important point in his ethics. Before this is done, it is necessary to go back to Kant's teachings on character, since

³⁹ Dr. Julius Bahnsen: "Das Tragische als Weltgesetz und der Humor also ästhetische Gestalt des Metaphysischen."

⁴⁰ *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, vol. I, p. 335.

Schopenhauer, according to his own avowal, has linked his own teachings those of Kant.

According to Kant, each appearance in nature has an empirical origin, which is the effect of another cause; in this series of empirical causes there is another which is not empirical, but only conceivable, or, as Kant terms it, "intelligible Ursache zu Grunde."⁴¹ In the character of man, as far as natural appearances go, there also exists such a dualistic basic cause. The empirical character is a link in the chain of things, is circumscribed in its treatment by natural laws; the intelligible character, on the contrary, is uncircumscribed, is free from all change, free from becoming or perishing, is therefore wholly free. This intelligible character is present in all deeds of man; and it is *determined*. In human character, as Kant explains it, freedom and necessity are bound up one with the other; freedom lies in the intelligible, the necessity in the empirical character, and both are present in every human situation. Freedom comes to man as a noumenon, necessity as a phenomenon.

Schopenhauer praises this teaching as the greatest pronouncement of Kant, and attaches to it several basic principles, which he would have us regard as consequences of this separation of the empirical from the intelligible character.

The basic character of man, he says, is the same in every one as in every other. In everyone, the main qualities are found. But there is so great a variation, such a difference in the combination and modification of the qualities among one another, that one may assume that the moral difference in the characters fully equals the intellectual difference.

The character of man is empirical. Through education alone one learns to discern it, not only in others but in oneself. Therefore one will often be disappointed, not only in others but also with himself, when he discovers that a man possesses this or that quality—for example, justice, selfishness, love of neighbor, courage—but not in the degree that was supposed. The precise knowledge of his own empirical character gives him that which one terms static character; whoever possesses it, whoever knows precisely his own qualities, good as well as bad, is certain to know what to trust and what to expect and what not.

⁴¹ This interpretation is that found in Schopenhauer's own Critique of the Kantian Philosophy.

✓ The character of man is constant, it remains forever the same during life. Only in direction does it experience apparent modifications, which flow from changing age and requirements. Man is never changed: as he has acted in one case, so will he always act under precisely equal circumstances. There are many, says Schopenhauer, who deny this truth; but even though denying it, they apply it to every act, and trust no longer the man whom they have once found dishonorable, abandoning him even though they had theretofore found him to be honest. For upon this truth, says Schopenhauer, rests all the knowledge of man, all the firm trust of what has been proved, experienced, established. Even if such a trust has some time deceived us, let us never say that the deceiver's character has changed, but that "I have been mistaken in him." And when we would consider the moral value of acts in order to appraise them and seek the motive behind them, then our praise or censure does not relate to the motive but to the character that reveals itself by such motive, as the secondary and inherent factor in the man in respect of that act.

The individual character is congenital; it is not a work of art, says Schopenhauer, nor is it something that accident subordinates to circumstance; it is the work of Nature herself. Character manifests itself already in the child, shows itself in youth as an earnest of what the future adult is to be; therefore even with complete similarity of education and circumstances affecting two children of basically different character, established at a given time, the character is precisely that which they will have in later age.

It might be supposed as a result of these basic principles (as he has set them forth in the "Grundproblemen der Ethik" with characteristic clarity) that Schopenhauer holds all education as futile, and improvement in man as impossible. And this opinion seems indeed to have its justification. But with deeper insight into his writings one is persuaded that Schopenhauer does not deny all results from education nor has he declared the improvement of man to be impossible. Socrates teaches: "Know thyself." Schopenhauer shared the view of his wise predecessor. "Blos die Erkenntnis," says he, "lässt sich berichtigen"; when man can attain to the insight that this or that means formerly employed by him does not lead to the end desired nor allows a greater profit, then he changes the means, not the aim. Generally, according to Schopen-

hauer, knowledge represents the realm and the scope of all improvement and all ennobling. Character is unchangeable; motives operate with necessity, but they have to pass through and be affected by knowledge, which is the medium of the motive. This, however, is capable of infinite extension, of eternal rectification, of countless gradation. In this, according to Schopenhauer, all education may cooperate. The development of reason through knowledge and insight of every kind is morally important, since by this means the motives of human conduct that are otherwise inaccessible are opened up. Hence it follows that under equal exterior circumstances the attitude of a man a second time may indeed be quite other than what it was the first time, if in the interim he has become able to comprehend rightly and fully all the circumstances, and new motives now have their effect on him that were inaccessible to him before. Further, if no moral influence is wrought upon the adjustment and the rectification of knowledge, the attempt to correct a man's faults of character by means of speech and moralizing, hoping thus to change his character and his morality, would be quite futile; it is altogether like trying to transmute lead into gold, or hoping, through careful nurture, to make an oak produce apricots.

There is still a great question that must press upon everyone as to these basic principles affecting character which are the consequence of the Schopenhauer teaching; and that is the question of the freedom of the Will, and the responsibility of man for his acts, or his accountability. Schopenhauer's solution of this question consists in this, that he *does* grant freedom—not however in the act, but in the *Being* of man. Even with all faith in his teachings, this pronouncement nevertheless remains obscure, and quite unsatisfactory if one makes the effort to derive from his teachings the man's responsibility for his acts.⁴²

The problem of the freedom of the Will is as important as it is difficult; one may enter upon research in the matter only with care, and I would not at all assume that my solution, set forth in the following attempt, which is at variance with that of Schopen-

⁴² Julius Frauenstädt, who made the greatest effort to free Schopenhauer's philosophy from all possible lacunae, as also to defend it against all possible attacks, considers his theories in respect of man's freedom and responsibility inadequate, and even suggests that they might as well be abandoned. (Neue Briefe ueber die Schopenhauersche Philosophie; Letter 38.)

hauer, is a satisfactory one. It may, rather, clarify or elucidate the question: for in the question itself, if formulated rightly, there is an intimation of the solution. With this thought I submit my explanation, although it goes far afield from the theme under consideration.

Let us first make a survey of the entire question in regard to the Will's freedom. We may unconditionally introduce, with the treatment of the Will, the concept of a decisive principle, be this the soul, or be it perhaps a blood-stream surging forth from the impulses of the brain which, somehow, gives to a part of the brain the power to inspire concepts.

Determinism is the theory that any decision, any influencing of the principle of decision-making, results exclusively from other principles, having their motivations in a predilection for or against the thing in question, or in the profit accruing to the entire welfare of the man, etc.

Indeterminism may be called a theory only because it denies that the "Decision Principle" operates without regard to the factor of motive. It can be and has been shown that determinism is an obscure and untenable theory. Before showing this, let us clarify the ethical notions that play a part in this question. It appears as though a will, as soon as it is certain that it is set or fixed through determining influences from which it absolutely cannot withdraw, can no longer be related to responsibility; so that there cannot any longer be an allegation of guilt for the evil wrought or of service for the good done. Yet one may well reflect in this connection as to whether the concept "Responsibility" in itself is unequivocally clear. In point of fact, it is not at all clearly set forth in Schopenhauer's language what is meant by this word. With the concept "Zurechnung" (Accountability), used instead of "Verantwortung" (Responsibility), the case stands far simpler. All deeds can, of course, only be rectified by the doer, if rectification can be effected at all. Now there are certainly two sorts of "Zurechnung," those that result from defence or protection, that must be employed against the bad acts of the doer, and, on the other hand, the credit coming to him for his good acts, to the extent that they *do* proceed from him. It is quite self-evident that one can protect himself against evil-doers only by reducing them to impotence, and that one can utilize the doer to one's own profit

only by appropriate means inclining him to good acts. What shall the word "Responsibility" now connote? When one says: "I take the responsibility for that," he means: "This thing I do or forswear doing I can prove to be good." "To be held responsible," means to make answer to a question, to stand ready to respond for the thing. The question then that is addressed to Character is the following: Was your deed good or bad; can you yourself declare your act to be good? And to this the good Character will answer: "Yes"; the bad, often, to himself will say softly: "No, my act was bad."

One has a sense of guilt as soon as he knows that an injury would not have been effected if something had been done or had not been done, and upon whose non-doing or doing the injured person, in pursuance of the current social and humane views, could depend.

The question propounded, however, is: "Did you have the power, as you committed the evil deed, also to refrain from it or to do a good deed?" If a wrong-doer should give an affirmative answer to this question, he would be wrong and would do himself an injustice. One may not insist of a wrong-doer that he be a philosopher. He believes probably that he should have done other acts, because at the time he could have conceived them, but it is an error if he believes that he should have given effect to these conceptions. One will soon learn that we have not therefore conceded the determinism of the will. A man cannot act otherwise, with a given personality, a given Will and given circumstances, in a given sphere, than he has, no more than a flower can put forth other than its own bloom. Man as a rule does not understand this; he believes that because he conceives the objective possibility of an act and because also at different moments of life's span, he has so acted or refrained from acting, he would always have the subjective possibility at any moment to do anything objectively possible. How should he think otherwise in regard to himself, since the subjective powers are withdrawn from his sight? One might call his error an intentional theological delusion, for it engenders accusations, or at least reproaches, which excite one to betterment and so lighten the penalty. When, however, this error passes away, and the "average man" as well as the erudite thinker understands that every deed was a function of

some absolute, necessary, and existing power, the responsibility would nevertheless not disappear; for this thought forever remains: Our deeds, and we as the doer, were good; or such and such acts, and we as actors, were bad. We would appear before God and probably say that we feel we are guilty or not guilty; we should in any case say we feel we are well-wishing spirits, or we feel we are evil spirits working injury. Although we were certain that God had made us all just as we are and just as we act, and has inculcated in us the norm of goodness, yet possibly this norm may be so weak that it cannot thrive against the perverse and luxuriant weeds of evil; and we would now appear before him and say (as, heaven knows, is still said daily by multitudes of people): God, you alone know the plan of the world, and wherefore we serve; but evil has possessed us; we serve, as we are, not in the province of the Good; help us and make us still better; chastise us but purify us. Accordingly if all acts however necessary in pursuance of any principle should follow, thereby the sense of our worth, the feeling of our badness, and the wish for radical improvement would not be destroyed. However certain it may be, on the one hand, that even with absolute determinism the feeling of responsibility exists—(for so one may term the consciousness of his rectitude or lack of rectitude, goodness or badness of his will)—equally certain it is that nothing can eventuate contrary to the nature of the actor. It is then an analytic principle that everything that happens, happens by means of the power of what happened, and not without and against it; and where there is a power to fashion power, then these power-engendering forces are determined and fixed by their nature. There is no principle that is exempt from the nature-determinations of its own being. If in a real world-in-itself the characters should elect that they desired to be a part of the world of appearance—one moved by ambition, another by the lust for pleasure, a third by love of neighbor, and so forth,—such determinations would likewise have incidence in their characters, and would flow from their nature, fixed by it. This determinism is unquestionable, and in any psychological treatment, there is hardly any occasion for discussion. The thing under discussion here is rather whether the will, not by virtue of its own nature, but unconditionally by reason of other principles, is dominated,—i.e. whether

it is autonomous, and sovereign, and autocratic, or is subordinate to other principles. One may maintain the so-called indeterminism, the other the usual determinism. And one might attempt to prove the falsity of the latter as follows:

Upon what, it is asked, according to determinism, is the will dependent? It will be dependent on the relative strengths of the different pleasures or pains, or upon the evaluation placed by the intelligence on the different goal objectives in respect of the comfort of man in general. These thoughts, however, are quite futile. There is, notwithstanding, a clear postulate that if one desires to direct the Will by elements outside of one's nature, then for the intensity of these elements one must have a factor of measurement, from the very outset. But this is wholly wanting, as a little reflection will show; and determinism thus does not follow the most simple logical requirements. Let us assume that one has the Will to encompass the maximum pleasure; then it would be necessary to determine what is the greatest pleasure. But one may not measure the various grades and kinds of pleasure; even with the twentieth-century psychologist's magnificent technique in handling sensation-intensity, one cannot say whether the desire to drink is stronger than sexual desire. On the other hand, one may say only that that desire for pleasure is the stronger for a given individual for which his Will has made decision; it is therefore not shown that the strength of the desire is a standard for the Will, but just that the "willing" determines the strength of the desire. Yet, to be sure, it is not always the desire, or the so-called strongest desire, that is the so-called motive of the Will. We see with love, for example, that often the need as motive is opposed by a far greater desire,—the desire to live. Where then is the measuring rod for the effective capacity of need?

Who may say: This or that need has in itself in contrast with others, or with desire or non-desire, a resulting relative preponderance? And where, finally, is the yardstick for the living-condition that is determined by the Intelligence to be appropriate? For things, goods, and conditions of life, how shall we regard the order of rank which the decision of the Will sets for them as standard? There is not even an appropriate determination of the strength of the motive, and therefore it is quite futile to say that the strongest motive at a given moment determines the Will. One

might answer of course by declaring that the evaluation of pleasure is different according to the character of the individual. But it is just this which destroys determinism. For character is precisely the Will Principle in man himself,—the bent of the Will for his elective decision. There is then no outstanding objective factor serving as standard for the Will; it is the Will which acts to determine what has worth for him. One believes that one glimpses a determination of the Will, in that reward and punishment, favorable and unfavorable prospects affecting well-being, have a very certain influence. Without reward and punishment, the direction of the Will, education, etc., would be impossible,—and yet one sees that both of these exercise some power. But this is a wholly false view of the situation. One does not determine the Will by reference to the outlook for good or evil results; one merely shows it the scope of things as to which it can make election. The Will, naturally, must first know that with any election, as, for example, in the case of injurious acts, this and that consequence is involved; otherwise the Will does not know the totality of the things as to which it makes selection. Yet these consequences, reward or punishment, do not entail that it must love one and fear the other, but merely that in respect of this hypothetical situation the Will remains the sovereign still, and declares itself, probably despite agreeable punishment, in favor of the punished act. We need hardly recall how children, in spite of punishment or reward resulting from any possible petty longing or inclination, still persist in it. The deciding principle—call it *soul*!—is indeed naturally a living principle that will generally determine the choice—whether it involves enjoyment, painlessness, or even a sadistic pain. But all general declarations are quite unimportant; for there may be chosen a moiety of pleasure along with a flood of displeasure, and there is no factual determination as to why the individual has decided for any one thing or any particular pleasure. The changing constitution of the body, health, the organs, the circulation of blood in the brain, and so forth, will decide. And for the entire play of our inclinations, humors, sympathies and antipathies, we shall seek in vain for a pre-determining regulator. Some future age may, quite suddenly, work an undreamed-of revolution in the mode of our Will's actions; in a word, we have no law for our Willing, no strange motivation for the principle of coming to decisions.

V

Quite apart from all other arts is the art of music. Music is not "just one more art." It is at once the summit of art and the sum of art. All other arts choose for their embodiment only one Platonic Idea,—only one level of the Will's objectivation. But music *turns inward* on the Will itself, and therefore on all Nature. Schopenhauer's language here becomes rhapsodic. He sees that the other arts speak only of shadows; music speaks of the Will itself. The composer of music reveals the real nature of the world, and expresses the deepest wisdom in a language which is beyond reason, which reason does not understand. Schopenhauer places the theory of music squarely upon the skirts of metaphysics, isolated from all prior and contemporaneous theories of it. "Sie ist nicht nur wie die übrigen Künste, Abbild der Ideen, sondern Abbild des Willens selbst, dessen Objectivation auch die Ideen sind."⁴³ "In den tiefsten Tönen der Harmonie, im grundbass finden wir die niedrigste Stufe der unorganischen Natur, die Masse des Planeten wieder."⁴⁴ In the aggregate of the many and various tonalities of harmony are found again the gradations of Ideas, "in welcher der Wille sich objectiviert." The intervals of the scale are parallel to the gradations of the objectivation of the Will. Since music is directly the objectivation of the Will, "so könnte man," says Schopenhauer, "die Welt ebenso gut verkörperte Musik als verkörperten Willen nennen." The inexpressible intimacy of music lets pass before us the world entire, with all its nuances. All of the living pain of existence with all of its unspeakable misery, the mysterious appointment of a sweet "Wehs," press on through our breast as an unsolved enigma. The deepest and but barely suspected agitation of our hearts is reflected anew by the harmonious chords of music. Only one factor is wanting in its differentiation from the world, and that is the *reality* of the pain and the anguish; therefore music is the ideally personified Will, that Will which manifests itself as what it is, without in stark reality making us corporeally sensible of the pain.

Schopenhauer has compared his philosophy to the hundred-gated Thebes, because every gate leads to the centre of the city;

⁴³ Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, vol. I, p. 340.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 340.

one may penetrate to the centre of his philosophy through its every part.⁴⁵ If now we seek through his theory of the tonal art, in musical analogy, to penetrate to the central point of the Schopenhauerian philosophy, we should in so doing see clearly how the genesis of his theory of music has an inner cohesion with his Metaphysics. When we speak of a "silence of the tomb," of a "stillness of the grave," and then—"mira in quibusdam rebus verborum proprietates est, et consuetudo sermonis antiqui, quaedam efficacissimis notis signat,"⁴⁶ silence is the mark of death; its converse is the mark of life. As a rule the baby comes into life with cries; it thus expresses, at the outset, its will to live. The crying in the first years of babyhood, which so often arouses the anguish of the mother, and causes in her the comfortless thought that she does not know what the young one wants, is frequently nothing other than the expression of the will to live, the longing for existence.

The liltings of birds in the forest, as well as the yodeling of the mountaineers, or the shrill whistling or trillings of the street urchin, however offensive to the ear, are but expressions of the same feeling. And yet at every stage in life, in every cultural rank, the happy frame of mind—the pervasive Will to life—involuntarily expresses itself through the medium of tone, whether it be self-created or from preserved memories. Through all animate creation (so far, at last, as its outer being has raised itself above the clod), this impulse surges; in man it manifests itself as soon as the spirit begins to be active, as soon as obscure feeling becomes clear knowledge, i.e. becomes *conscious*—in speech as expression of the spirit or the reason on the one hand, and song as expression of the perceptions on the other.⁴⁷ The emotions, the stronger agitations of the mind, the intensive Will, no longer content with speech, creates its own powerful expression, and goes back unconsciously to the natural condition and finds expression in single sounds, by means of interjections, until, with increasing anxiety, these are no longer serviceable and the sigh alone is left.

⁴⁵ Preface to the first edition of "Der beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik."

⁴⁶ Seneca's Epistle, 81, quoted by S. in "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," vol. I, p. 40.

⁴⁷ Les chants (says Bichat) sont le langage des passions, de la vie organique, comme la parole ordinaire est celui de l'entendement, de la vie animale. Quoted by S. in "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," vol. II, p. 307.

We have here reached the limit of the expressions of the Will to live; the sigh, indeed, is the softest and the quietest of manifestations; but, as everywhere, the old principle holds good: "Les extrêmes se touchent."⁴⁸ Man alone, of all animals, has the capacity to sigh, and the higher the cultural level he may have attained, the purer his spirit, the nobler his soul, the clearer-seeing his spiritual eye, the more frequently his breast emits a sigh. It is even said the Negro is unable to sigh. Thus, accordingly, the weakest physical expression is the highest spiritual one. In it philosophy and poetry are centered and merged. The profound thinker and the tender lover are both content but to sigh. And as the happy frame of mind finds expression in a gamut ranging from soft trillings to the loud and ululating sounds born of joy, so also rises the expression of pain, from the sigh to the lament of despair. And this, if the matter be delved into more closely, is none other than the expression of the Will to life. It is, likewise, the last cry of the drowning; the desperate man does not renounce life, but will rather retain it, he will still live, or, in the words of Schopenhauer,—he affirms the Will to live. And just as reason fashions and raises the expression of thought to ordered speech, so that the cooings of the babe at the breast evolves into well-formed utterance, [so the tonal art assembles and organizes all of these expressions of the feeling—of the Will to live—that are expressed by tones;] it is essential that music must echo in the breast as well as in the ear of the artist, so that he will desire to master it and to reproduce it. All scales, as well of joy as of pain, he must run through; and if he has retained and knows how to inculcate this harmony within himself, then art has attained to being, and music has birth.

Music for Schopenhauer is a universal speech, which stands in the same relation to concepts as ordinary speech to things. The world is embodied music, and when the understanding can reproduce what music inspires, then music becomes a true philosophy. And so Schopenhauer sees in music an unconscious philosophizing, and so ranks it far above the position accorded it by Leibnitz, as an unconscious counting by the soul. "Music," says Leibnitz,⁴⁹ "charms us, although her beauty rests only in har-

⁴⁸ Quoted by S., in "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," vol. II, p. 532.

⁴⁹ Principe de la Nature et de la grace, No. 17, p. 718, quoted by Kuno Fischer, in "Geschichte der neuen Philosophie," vol. II, p. 348.

monious number-relationships, and consists in an unconscious counting." This difference of opinion is explained by the fact that while Leibnitz apprehends this art as a low one, Schopenhauer, on the other hand, regards it as higher, indeed, as of the highest rank. While Leibnitz believes music to be the merely blind practice of mathematics, Schopenhauer detests this association of music with a science so highly intellectual as mathematics. He corrects Leibnitz's statement to say: Music is the blind practice of metaphysics,—it is an unconscious philosophizing. Music, according to Schopenhauer, becomes the art which seeks out the expressions of the Will to life in all its manifold modes, and in its representation of it becomes that factor of the Will which philosophy strives to attain only by other ways; and so it is all the more an unconscious philosophizing. Schopenhauer's view of it stands upon as much higher a plane than that of Leibnitz, to employ an analogous example, as the Platonic theories on the subject of Ideas are superior to the Pythagorean theories of calculation.

Its being so general a speech results from the fact that, without copying any object from the outside world, it is the direct expression of spiritual states, and precisely for this reason the effect of music is so much more powerful and more pervasive than that of the other arts, for these speak only of shadows. Music, however, speaks of existence; it evokes *directly* in man similar (or, rather, identical) emotions, whose *direct* expression it is; the plastic and poetic arts demand a mediator if they would also stir the emotions of man through concepts borrowed from the outside world. Consequently music does not give us, as in the case of sculpture, painting or poetry, a picture of the outer world or a representation of the inner world of man; music *immediately places* this inner world there.

Schopenhauer's theory of music reveals a fine and profound musical feeling. He properly esteems the ineffable sincerity and the immediacy in music, and this esteem is one of the important factors of his aesthetics, which for all time will testify to his many-sided spirit.

Yet, on the other hand, he does not accept these aesthetic facts as such, merely in order to seek a further psychological basis for them; he is content to rest his case on this inner relationship,

the immediate connection between musical impressions and the inner agitation of the feelings. He links up these appearances with metaphysics, and ascribes to music, above all other arts, a metaphysical importance. [The statement of Schopenhauer that music is a universal speech has no basis in psychological impulses, but it implicitly contains an explanation which sets forth the inner relationship in which music stands to the real existence of the world.

If, however, music really has this highest metaphysical importance as among all arts, then he should have found in its total consequences a refutation of his pessimism; his theory of music should have become for him a point of support which should have revealed to him another and more inspiring outlook.

Music, as we have said, gives back to us all the emotions of our heart, of our innermost being, but quite without reality, free of all pain or suffering. If now, as Schopenhauer teaches, the world as idea is only the certainty of the Will, of things in themselves, then art (as he also insists) is a picture, a mirror, of which the objects permit a clear and more distinct view in their existence. If this characterization of art is a true one, then the feelings and the perceptions that it evokes in us are evidence of the nature of the objective world. If the conflicts among the ideas represented by art do not actually cause disgust, then this variance cannot be irreconcilable. [If music represents the existence of the world and yet may not set itself forth by disharmonies, then the existence of the world cannot be disharmonious; the disharmonies must rather be, in some degree, an indispensable appanage, a means to the achievement of the harmony. | It is a pity Schopenhauer did not live to see the radical revolution that has been wrought in the formal science of harmony, in respect of its determination of what constitutes dissonance and what does not, by the great composers of the later nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. He could have heard the deeper concord inherent in the "discordant" pages of Strauss, of Debussy, or of Stravinsky, and seen a sophisticated generation of music-lovers, willing to characterize as harmonious, what their predecessors would have deemed cacophonous,—not through captiousness, but in consequence of a wider aural experience with the interplay of tone. It is possible that he foresaw this development in musical art, the

germs of which of course existed in his own time, and thus derived fuller sanction for the sweeping application he made of it in his ethics. / The great evil and the manifold suffering, which he disavows in respect of every sort of theism and optimism, should then be to him, in the entire complex of appearances, a necessary element to the creation of a harmonic world system. The existing strife must find its reconciliations in another less devious manner, if the feelings evoked in us by the contemplation of art have any objective justification; they cannot be the expression of pure egoism; it must embody in itself the conditions of a final expression. If Schopenhauer means, not that the musical disharmonies lose themselves in another second world as harmonies, but that in disharmony itself lies harmony, then the reconciliation of the contrarieties of life must be realized, not by the negation of life, but in its release or redemption. The aesthetic opinions of Schopenhauer may actually preserve us, therefore, from an awful sinking into a *Weltanschauung* which depicts, as its highest postulate, a negation of the Will to live; it grants to us a point of support, and opens before us the possibility of a truly healthy view of life.

With this theory of music Schopenhauer concludes his study of aesthetics, and in leaving it he has well justified what none hitherto had been inclined to doubt—that the world of art is none other than a "play within the play," the stage on the stage,—a chamber in which the soul, with delusive struttings and frettings, at last wearies, and with unstilled yearnings thirsts for holy renunciation as a mitigation, on its way to the greatest bliss.

VI

THE FUNCTION OF ART

Man must banish every wish, every passion and desire when contemplating a work of art; or, rather, true works of art preclude these things when the viewer abandons himself wholly to his impressions. The effect of true art is, of course, always dependent on the subjective nature of the viewer.⁵⁰ If the spiritual element is dominant in him, then art will give him the high-

⁵⁰ Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, vol. I, p. 264, and also in chapter 38.

est pleasure, the greatest bliss; but, on the other hand, if the will, which is only a forwarding and propelling force, predominates, then the effect of art is either nothing or of negligible quantity. Since, in every man who is capable of both, the intellect is interwoven with the will, they will always have a struggle which constitutes a theatre also for the struggle for victory between pleasure or displeasure.⁵¹ The degree of intensity of this struggle between intellect and will is for Schopenhauer the principle of the difference between "Beautiful" and "Sublime," so that when the object, by reason of its magnitude, strength or other qualities, assumes a position inimical to the observer and threatens his physical being, thereby intensifying the struggle, the resulting victory of the intellect over the will is the perception of the Sublime, and that object is, according to Schopenhauer, to be termed "sublime."

In this eternal antagonism in the subject, there is but one criterion, and that is pure art that is an actual fulfillment of its own aim, a true manifestation of willing, a true picture of the Idea. The more the object corresponds to its existence or being, the greater the gratification of the beholder; the more it falls short of accomplishment of its purpose, the greater is the discomfort of the viewer, as evidence of the thwarted will.

The effect of art, then, is to please, and this causes a gradual suppression of the lowly and insatiable will. The degree of this pleasure, however, depends both on the observer and on the extent to which the art fulfills its aim. With these objective and subjective aspects of the effect of art, according to Schopenhauer, all aesthetic appraisals come together.

Speaking now of art alone, without regard to the nature and capacity of the observing subject, we tend to call that work of art beautiful which seems to involve purely objective and intuitive contemplation, and which liberates us from the effects of care and sorrow which depress and shackle the Will.⁵² To do this it is necessary, quite apart from subjective conditions, that the purpose of the work of art shall accord with the concept of truth,⁵³ and shall perpetually illumine the idea one receives, in its greatest

⁵¹ *Idem*, vol. I, chapter 38.

⁵² *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, vol. I, p. 271.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, vol. II, ch. 34.

purity and clearness. It should not remind us of any particular associations, and we should not have any human or earthly interest in it; it must, for example, give us the idea of humanity, yet without the notions of time and space, or the incidental qualities relative to it. Out of every work of art these words must sound: "This is Life, the real and true nature of the world, as it was a thousand years ago and still is today."⁵⁴ There must come from the art, whatever sort it may be, the Ideas clearly and distinctly stated,—the depiction of the neverchanging forms and properties of all natural inorganic and organic bodies and the manifest common powers that exist in connection with Nature's laws. If this is the case, then we shall be able to recognize it in a moment, and, by contemplation of it, be raised above all interests recalled to us in consequence of our habits or emotions. Beauty—in an objective sense—consists therefore in the truth of the Idea and in an illumination of this truth to the point that we can attain a pure and will-less condition of intuition, wherein there is no question of space and time, but, as with universal eye,⁵⁵ one sees the existence of things in their true form.

Therefore to the genius, to the artist, the highest conceivable task is assigned, just as⁵⁶ Lessing assigned it to them; they may place themselves at the side of God as the "moral creators," and by their works may fashion a simulacrum of the All made by the infinite creator. What, however, shall aid the artist in performing this well-nigh impossible task? How may he anticipate the whole of nature, and embrace all the eternal and unalterable ideas that appear in nature,—of which at any time only a part is at hand, and that part wreathed in the deceptive fog of appearance? Schopenhauer answers thus: The gift of genius shall aid the artist, and genius is the faculty of observing, under conditions of spiritual calm, the deliverance of Ideas from the bondage of the Will. In such contemplation, the genius grasps what Nature in the course of her great development comprises; he also foresees this development, since he moulds in the present what the future conceals in the chambers of the unknown. And this he does not as an empty illusion, ridiculed by every substantiality; somehow an inner voice

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. I, ch. 49, and vol. II, pp. 476-477.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 219.

⁵⁶ *Hamburg. Dramaturgie*, p. 79.

indicates to the truly receptive soul which particular future species to depict as significant.⁵⁷

To beauty belongs also, as a correlative, the victory of intellect over the will. The work of art may be the Idea itself—it were all the better for us if we take to it the conditions necessary for understanding the Idea. It is not given to every one to emerge from the customary sphere of knowledge in which one simply considers the relations of things with himself and as among one another. One of the stimulants to the activity of the genius, by which he abandons himself wholly and clearly to the object, liberates him for a complete objectivation of the consciousness, in which he is quite submerged and dissociated from all relation to his own Will.

One may not have a personal interest in the object; otherwise the will, through the emotions, will awaken discontent. The desire to acquire or possess the object, so pathetically displayed for example by art collectors and book collectors, can only contaminate the aesthetic experience. The contemplation must be pure and disinterested if the work of art is to be beautiful in the subjective sense.

From either or both of the two meanings Schopenhauer attaches to the beautiful, it follows axiomatically that Nature also is beautiful.⁵⁸ First, every thing, every color, every form and every mixture of colors is innately beautiful; secondly, in Nature there are no failures, only successes. Failure may result only where a task or a faculty is demanded, and there is nothing of this sort in Nature. The objects of Nature are not *subjected* to a comprehension standing before them; therefore they can never be unsatisfactory to the comprehension. Nature, indeed, makes the comprehension; she forces it upon us.

It should be pointed out that although, according to Schopenhauer, everything is beautiful in Nature, there is however, a greater or lesser beauty. A serpent, aside from the idea it pre-

⁵⁷ Cf. Wilhelm Humboldt, Werke IV, p. 22, and Hegel's "Aesthetik," I, p. 200. Similarly Lotze has said: "Wir meinen nicht, dass das Schöne der Kunst aus einem nirgends vorhandenen, in dem leeren Spiel der Einbildungskraft kreisenden Himmel tauschend vorstellen sollte, sondern dieselbe Welt, in der wir leben, soll unseren Blicken durchsichtig werden, und jeder Schritt im Reiche der Kunst soll uns gemahnen, zugleich ein Schritt in der wahrsten Wirklichkeit zu sein." Miscellaneous Works, vol. II, p. 216.

⁵⁸ Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, vol. I, ch. 41, vol. II, ch. 33.

sents as a species of animal life, offers a beautiful form, a suave motion, and an interesting example of animal symmetry, but a lion in his stride alone presents all of these qualities. As Nature sets an appearance before us, she gives us immediately a comprehension thereof, and while she is naturally sufficient to this comprehension, she has also directed attention to it. She has implanted an idea, as the compelling clue or guide for this attention. Nature presents to us a fir tree, and along with this presentation a picture or symbol of graceful slenderness or regularity; and in this directing of the attention,—to factors in combination defined by her,—she has her satisfaction. So with everything in Nature, no matter how diverse the beauty. Straight or crooked, light or dark, all is clear and distinct, and all is beautiful; there the broad stream in its regularity, here the brook with its twistings and turnings, the flower-bedecked meadow and the monotonous steppe. If transitions in the colors of the clouds are exquisite and delicate, that very delicacy is compelling and interesting; if, however, the clouds are dark and massed, and if a streak of the blue heavens shimmers between them, there is manifested the accentuation of contrast. It will be easily noted that there is here no mere deduction from an idea that an appearance contains within itself an inescapable declaration of itself. If early spring is filled with dark violets, the meadow darkly green, the water dark steel-blue, or if everything in the summer is bathed in an ethereal blue, the meadow in any case is true, genuine, and interesting. The coming autumn mightily and relentlessly and certainly expresses itself by every fading flower and leaf, by cloud and wind, yet it is only in this way that autumn comes! And so it is with everything in Nature; there is no inconsistency, all is complete, the idea is presented, and all is beautiful.

Yet along with such completeness, Nature also offers in her appearances the incomplete—incomplete because the conditions are unfavorable,—often so much so that she cannot develop their true beautiful existence by untrammelled ideas. Since, however, the work of the artist must be wholly free from such mischance, from the limitations of the Real, and may not be affected by obstructive mechanical factors, so he cannot succeed by mere imitation; he then loses reality and enters wholly into the realm of the ideal; that is, he places the genuine Nature there, or, as Schopenhauer

says, "Er versteht die Natur auf halbem Wege, und ruft ihr zu, das war es, was du sagen wolltest! und ja, das war es, hallet es aus dem Kenner wieder." | This thought existed, of course, before Schopenhauer; it was stated by Lessing (although on a wholly different, speculative and metaphysical basis),⁶⁰ by Kant,⁶⁰ and later was elaborated with great clarity by the united efforts of Schiller and Goethe, and then expressed by Schiller in terms that for all time are the standard—"Phantastische Gebilde willkürlich aneinander reihen, heisst nicht ins Ideale gehen, und das wirkliche nachahmend wiederbringen, heisst nicht die Natur darstellen, beide Forderungen stehen so wenig in Widerspruch miteinander, dass sie vielmehr ein und dieselbe sind; die Kunst nur dadurch wahr ist, dass sie das Wirkliche verlässt und rein ideel wird."⁶¹

It follows further from the existence of the Idea, which irrespective of the variety of its stages is always fully objectified, that among the objects of Nature, man is the most complete objectification of the will; that is, he is the highest idea and the most splendid; and that art is highest which has presented man as an object and given him the highest rank in the world of art,—i.e. the world of art outside of music, which presents not the idea but the will itself—the world in its totality.

If a given work of art has not fulfilled the aims of art, if it is not true to the inner existence of such aims, then it can neither be beautiful in itself, since it cannot evoke pleasure, nor can it be considered beautiful by the beholder, even though he find himself in the most perfect state of artistic contemplation. The next effect of a work of art of this sort (which approximates reality with all of its necessary faults and failures, and which in fact is no longer true Art) is in the fact that the intellect (since the Idea is deficient in purity) seeks satisfaction in vain, and the similarly deficient will, becoming a mere corpse, is thrust into the background. | Only the truth can give pleasure; the want of it vitiates pleasure, and nullifies the will in its action and in its dominance over the intellect. In the absence of truth we have accordingly the different gradations of beauty in the wider sense,—

⁶⁰ Hamburg. Dramaturgie, pp. 70-79.

⁶⁰ Kritik der Urtheilskraft, ch. 45.

⁶¹ Hempel's edition of Schiller's Works, vol. 14, p. 550.

the sense of the "artistically effective." As one of these gradations we have ugliness.⁶² This is characterized in art by the complete abandonment of the representation of the Idea, and by giving expression to the least essential reality, which no longer has any resemblance to the Idea. This difference between the Idea and Reality is not necessarily always great: yet however great or small it may be, we can in any event recognize it, since now we are indeed competent in the exercise of the intellect, which is, besides, fashioned by the general Will to recognize Ideas. A normal man, considered purely by the understanding, can at times have great similarity to the idea of the man; but there are exceptions in which the traces of similarity are absent, both in purely corporeal and in spiritual relations. The work of art that presents such a picture evokes in the observer not only the will dominating the intellect, but awakens also the contrary will, which struggles in vain; but instead of struggling, as before, with the intellect (on viewing the object of beauty), this time it struggles to keep from being subdued by the hostile will. For the will does not press on in a reciprocal way, but pushes and thrusts itself forward in order to triumph over its neighbor.⁶³ This triumph, however, will not be conceded in the case of ugliness.

Between the beautiful—which represents the authority of Idea and the intellect—and ugliness—which represents the authority of reality and the strife of wills, lies a gradation of beauty which does not call forth the opposition of the will, and consequently stands higher than ugliness. It is the alluring, the attractive, the "pretty";⁶⁴ it merely titillates the will, excites desire, and often promotes lust. With this also—"das Reizende"—the pure expression of the Idea has succeeded poorly; it is intermingled with the lower sphere of reality; and therefore such a product spurs our emotions and charms them. Whatever has this effect can never be an object of pure quiet contemplation; it can never be, in the nature of things, a beautiful thing.

Another gradation of the beautiful is the sublime.⁶⁵ In works of art as in Nature, when something may be termed sublime, the

⁶² Schopenhauer sees in ugliness only "die unvollkommene Objektivierung des Willens" (vol. I, p. 264).

⁶³ Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, vol. I, ch. 27.

⁶⁴ Ibid., vol. I, ch. 40.

⁶⁵ Idem, vol. I, ch. 39.

dominance of the idea over reality takes place in a striking fashion in the intellect, which on its part must again be conscious of a great victory over the corporeal will.

These four gradations of beauty—the sublime, the alluring, the beautiful, and the ugly,—are the four general concepts of aesthetic judgment; everything is ordered in subordination to them. They are all bound together by the relation of the intellect to the will, on the one hand, and by that of the idea to reality, on the other. This holds good both as to Nature and to art. Even the ugly has its worth and has its justification in art as a form of beauty, though in a negative way, through its relation to the beautiful *qua* beautiful. Ugliness, *per se* and alone, in an object of art, would constitute a sin against the "Idee" of Art; to be sure, however, it may stand as a contrast to the beautiful, which is all the more excellent because it then shows the beautiful in its entire worth. The truth that is manifested in Nature as well as in art by the depiction of the Idea, does not have the same effect for all men; considered in itself, it fulfills its aims only in different modes. Gradations of beauty only become such through their effect, for which as a rule the existence of an intuiting spirit, a pure will-less subject, is a condition,—although the intuition is sometimes, after a struggle, thrust by the will into the background. To those men who lack the spirit of intuition, and who only consider Nature and art by the powers of their comprehension, the pure idea is without effect: in them the enjoyment of art is generally never awakened. Nature to them is an object, and art a weak imitation thereof, which deludes or jests, but contributes nothing to the knowledge of the inner existence of the world. If anything in art pleases them, it is only the external form, which narrowly concentrates that which functions in the great laws of Nature. This formal beauty goes excellently hand in hand with the technical trifling and dilettantism of those so-called artists who are no more able to penetrate into the inner being of art than into the inner existence of the world.

VII

THE LIMITATIONS OF ART

Art, the delineator of the world, therefore imitates the idea, never the reality. Therefore it achieves a higher reality which is

freed from the dross of merely contemporaneous issues and material substances. However, precisely because it does depict through material means, it lacks the ability to reproduce the Idea purely as it is; for by reason of the materiality of the means, certain material conditions enter into the Idea, whose one and paramount function is individuation. The limitation of art, externally viewed, then consists in the fact that it can neither depict stark reality nor present the pure Idea.

Upon similar grounds Art is not linked to the majority of material objects that can be presented in single individuals, but is an imitation of the Ideas in classes or types. And these classes or types never appear as pure pictures to be viewed, but, since they involve a union with individuals, can present the material Art only as an Idea in the individuation, that is, as an Ideal.⁶⁶ The Ideal is just the projection of the difference between the individual reality and the Idea, and, at the same time, the oneness of the individual reality *with* the Idea; the Ideal is the Idea in its individuation. Pure Ideas that are the object of art remain forever the unalterable model-makers; in their presentation, however, they can only occur in material forms, and take the character of materiality, that is, of individuality.

Although Ideas in their purity, however, are not depictable for their materiality, yet they remain always the great forms through which the intuitive spirit works, and as they are the model for the spirit, which seeks to imitate them in the individuality, so they remain also the norms according to which art, despite its task of individuating, separates into classes and types. Also, if these are not set forth as visible representations, they should, for human understanding, be given recognition as a collection of apprehensions, in which the understanding subordinates them in single individual art productions. The understanding here works indeed only empirically, as it groups the individual art appearances, in each of which the individuated idea is impressed; but the necessity of recognizing this grouping we only attain to when we attain the types of the objectivation, the Ideas, which are the object of art, either as directly appearing or as purely visualized thoughts, although they never appear to us in this pure form. With the

⁶⁶ Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, vol. I, ch. 7, ch. 45.

differentiation and separation of Ideas into gradations, there is still no established organization; at the least the substance enters in as accident, by which they are merely repeated. On the one hand, therefore, the Arts must organize, and this organization reveals their inner limits, according to the content of the type of the objectivation, commencing with the most general powers of Nature, passing over to the Ideas of the inorganic, further to the unconscious and onward to the conscious organic objects, and terminating with the highest and most complete type of the Will's objectivation, to organically conscious man.⁶⁷ On the other hand, these different ideas which, empirically considered, are apprehended as species of things, again must in their artistic representation be classified according to the type,⁶⁸ since the means of material representation is a limit beyond which art cannot pass, and is a condition to which she is absolutely subordinated.

The weakest and lowest objectivity of the will is represented by the ideas of matter—mass, density, cohesion and hardness—comprehended as species in the empirical sense. The art which depicts these Ideas is architecture,⁶⁹ the material by which they appear, stone. Mass and density are now objectivations of the will's struggling powers. This struggle toward tangibility is the purpose of architecture (considering it purely aesthetically, not from the standpoint of utility). Its weight causes a strain which suggests motion, its rigidity causes the strain to be at rest, and the motion to cease. A work of architecture wherein the weight is brought into appropriate relationship with the rigidity, is beautiful. The appropriateness, however, consists in this,—that the weight of the stone shall be made to press directly on the earth; otherwise the structure would quickly fall in a heap of stone. This is prevented by the rigidity, which maintains the heavy stone, so that only by its means does the stone press properly on the ground. Works of architecture that do not possess this relation in adequate measure, or in which the parts are not in agreement with this relation, do not exemplify the Idea at the lowest stage of the Will; the beauty thereof is diminished proportionately to

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. I, ch. 27 and ch. 36.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. I, ch. 36. "Je nach dem der Stoff ist, in welchen sie (die Kunst) wiederholt, ist sie bildende Kunst, Poesie oder Musik."

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, vol. I, ch. 43, vol. II, ch. 35. The statements concerning the function of architecture are especially important in the sequel.

the degree in which it is wanting in this respect. Those works are the most beautiful, of course, in which heaviness and rigidity, load and support, are as free and separately located as in the case of columns and beams; but again, this is the case only when these can so certainly function that our Will is in no way involved by being made apprehensive.

After this brief exposition the further question arises as to whether architecture is an imitating art. Schopenhauer specifically denies this.⁷⁰ And yet in the sense in which we have understood imitation, and as we had to understand it according to Schopenhauer's statements, there is no doubt that architecture imitates or copies. In fact, the imitation here consists not in an object become Idea, but in the copying of the general Idea of the matter itself.⁷¹ The Idea has, of course, in this lowest stage found no form that could lead the artist to an easier knowledge or imitation thereof; this does not belong at all to the conditions of imitation. The Idea of the matter is copied in architecture directly, and without intermediation; and if this Idea were not the lowest rank of the objectivation of the Will, the art of imitation would transform architecture, as it has music, into the highest and noblest Art. So it remains only the picture of the tonal "ground-bass" of Nature and therefore also—aesthetically considered,—the lowest of the Arts.

The beautiful art of the utilization of water, which Schopenhauer includes as an appendix of architecture, can indeed, according to our opinion, not be considered as beautiful art; for in it there is no notion of weight or fluidity imitated by means of the water factor. In addition to this, if the art of water-utilization were but an administrative or a controlling thing, forcing the water to leave its native channel in a predestined direction to serve an inner purpose, such an administrative art would be a pure formality only, and the control of the water would never be a picture of the Idea of the water. What is beautiful in it is but the nature of the water itself, which according to a given direction comes forth as a wholly special appearance, e.g. as in a spring, or a fountain. Schopenhauer has therefore devoted but twelve lines to this art, without further developing his ideas on

⁷⁰ Cf. *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, vol. I, p. 470.

⁷¹ The *μυμησις* of Plotinus is also related to this notion.

the subject.⁷² The same holds true of the landscaping art,⁷³ which Schopenhauer terms an art which represents the idea of the organically non-conscious, that is, the vegetable kingdom. Here also the beautiful in the art remains always Nature.

Water and plants, since they represent ideas, are likewise objects of art, and the art which is wrought through them will be considered to rank immediately after architecture, since the idea of the water and the vegetable nature ranks next after the stone or the idea of heaviness or rigidity, in the process of the Will striving against consciousness. But the depicting artist cannot directly operate with them if he desires to imitate them: he cannot copy the foamy sea, or imitate it with water so as to present the picture thereof; the water itself would again desire an imitation. The same holds also in the case of plants.

For water, as the Idea next higher in rank to that of the plant world, light is held to be the general symbol which works thereon and which in its true form is called upon to direct our perceptions. The water merges with light in continual change and movement, whereas the plant merges with the light in quiet and calm; not that they *were* both light, but that in them light comes to expression. And so the artist will be able to reproduce his ideas best with light, in a substance which expresses the color of the light in conformity with the empirical and customary powers of the expression of color. Pigments ordinarily consist of vegetable matter, and in their application water is used, whence the painter⁷⁴ by preference should choose an object from the field to which it owes its capabilities. Architecture must also embrace painting, and, within the latter, marine painting, because of the notion of the water, and then landscape painting, because it presents the notion of vegetable nature. The two ideas can only be presented by painting; but painting can, of course, present other ideas which may come within its province; it also serves for those other ideas and objects which require light for their representation and for which there are colors which come from the inorganic and animal worlds.

The level just above the vegetable is the animal, and as the material with which the imitating is effected is generally not

⁷² Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, vol. I, ch. 43.

⁷³ Ibid., vol. I, ch. 44.

⁷⁴ Ibid., vol. I, ch. 44, ch. 45.

capable of representing bodies, it follows that the idea of animal nature may be reproduced by painting. Landscape painting therefore follows as the next higher stage in painting animal life, and next higher the painting of man, whether genre or history, or portrait painting, which in painting is the highest and most perfect achievement of the art.⁷⁵

In animal painting the object is nearly merged with the idea; the idea itself has not yet complete consciousness in this material, and therefore again has not arrived at characteristic individuality. The painting of man, however, as the general Idea of a given man, is a very special subject. The beauty which is represented to us here is at the same time a higher one than that of all inferior substances, precisely because man is the most perfect objectivation of the Will upon the highest material within his cognition.⁷⁶

The idea of man, however, reaches its best justification if art finds the means of depicting him as a figure in space, emphasizing the elegance of his appearance, his movement and action, his proceedings and emotions. Painting comprehends better the character in its *inner* workings; the *movement* in which character at times comes into play is reproduced by sculpture. To be sure, paintings also depict the movements of man, but the effects of these movements remain in the picture only one-sided and faint, whereas in sculpture there is shown the movement of all of the grain of the body, visible to us from all sides. The beauty of movement, which appears only in such impulse, is grace. And the same is likewise true of animals.

Sculpture looks farther back in the same material in which architecture operates; this is grounded on the existence of the depicted object which, as the highest in the world, has the most inferior stage of the will for its equipment. But to man there is also reserved a third kind of representation—outside of stone and colors—which can be wrought with all the means appropriate to the accomplishment of artistic appearance, and through which alone he can attain to the most complete representation.

⁷⁵ Schopenhauer has still, of course, not considered these consequences completely; however, certain thoughts in vol. I, ch. 45 point the way.

⁷⁶ Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, vol. I, ch. 41. "Der Mensch ist vor Allem schön, und die Offenbarung seines Wesens das höchste Ziel der Kunst." Cf. also ch. 45.

With poetry,⁷⁷ according to its means of representation—words—, thoughts and treatment have relation *only* to the field of man, so man himself is her proper artistic object. Also, in this speech proper to him, man can set forth the ideas that come to him from any source, even though the words only represent conceptions. But the observer, or rather, hearer, is himself indeed a man, and he can obtain from the words and their treatment the clearest conception of the Idea that may be presented to him through his intuition and imagination. With speech, of course, one can reproduce a charming landscape in the mind of the hearer. One can thus reproduce a storm at sea, or even animal life, as well as the idea of man; but for the latter in particular, poetry is most appropriate. That the dramatic art is the highest within poetry and that within dramatic art again tragedy comprises the highest material, is self-explanatory, since it represents the idea of the highest existence in nature.

For tragedy the paramount rule is the idea of humanity, not in its merely fortuitous relation with time and space, but in the true being and existence of man and the living world within him, and in the picture of his suffering and his unhappiness; if it achieves this, then it has wrought wondrously well.⁷⁸

All ideas show themselves in the world as objectified, and all the above-mentioned arts—with the exception of architecture—appraise in terms of the idea, yet only so far as they are recognizable as objectifications of the will,—recognizable to our understanding through the perception of the senses. Music, utilizing the nimblest, most volatile, most nearly “spiritual” material, does not require the idea to be set before us as a means of objectivation; she directly appraises the Will, the real existence of this world, the eternal stress, the eternal disagreement and reconciliation. And to this extent music is itself an objectivation of the Will, in which all its stages appear at the same time: its ground-bass represents inorganic Nature; in sequence over it come the voices, which are the plants, and farther along the animal world; the topmost one dominates all these lower stages and provides them with value, and is to them, as melody is to harmony, their condition and their prerequisite.)

⁷⁷ Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, vol. I, ch. 51.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. I, ch. 51, vol. II, ch. 37.

VIII

THE AIM OF ART

The will in the world is ever an inordinate thing, never to be satisfied, always expressing itself;⁷⁹ its effort is directed toward its own objectivation, with the highest stage of its objectivation being the attainment to consciousness, the achievement of the capability of having knowledge of itself.⁸⁰ The intellect of man may be deemed the light of the world and of the Will, which light the Will itself has created.⁸¹ If then the stages of the objectivation are the stages of the objectivator, we are led to proclaim the goal of the Will—to illumine itself and to know; these stages are then at the same time, in and for themselves, different manifestations of the Will striving for knowledge, on the way to considering the Will itself as the object of knowledge. The Will, which has only become object for subject, is now so far known only as it appears, and by an intellect, which receives impressions and comprehends. Yet this sort of manifestation, this sort of “getting-to-know,” does not content the will; therefore it brings in a subject, which itself receives ideas,—those immediate intuitions of which we spoke in the first section above. While the Will thus enlightens itself, it creates for itself a more profound sort of knowledge, which gives to the subject more light upon the existence of the will than the simple consideration of only the formal being, or appearance. Further, this subject requires participation in the subject who exists only for the objective being; and therefore the pure subject, the knowledge which it has garnered from ideas, makes this understandable to it by perceptual means. Art, therefore, as it appears to man, is but the perception of a higher knowledge, that integrates itself from ideas and the pure intellect. And this perception has as its immanent aim to transfer to man the higher knowledge of the world that the Will has created.

The primary aim of art, accordingly, for which art exists in the world and through which she retains her position in the

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, vol. I, ch. 29 and ch. 23, vol. II, ch. 28.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, vol. I, ch. 27 and 28.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, vol. II, ch. 22 and 19.

universe (besides the indirect aim, already mentioned in the first section above) is to bring into consciousness the knowledge of the existence of the world.⁸² As philosophy is a mirror of the conceptual world, so is art the reflector or repetition of the world in pictures; as philosophy elucidates the existence of the world to reason, so art does to feeling,—in visible, unreflecting, discursive representations. And so art takes, according to Schopenhauer, the same rank as philosophy;⁸³ for it has the same goal, only the means by which it is attained are different. Which of these two manifestations of the spirit has precedence may not be determined here without further consideration; however, so much is certain, that art, because it enters into the ideas of the world for us, grants us an undoubtedly higher and deeper knowledge of the world than that which merely comes to us from appearance. For in ideas we have a more adequate picture of the Will (*i.e.* of the existence of the world) than is set forth in the merely objective. Justifying art from the subjective side, one would say that the means by which ideas are here recognized give us a more profound insight into the working of the world than do the concepts of space, time or causality; justifying it from the objective side, we would merely say that art, so to speak, is a key that opens to us the innermost existence of the world. Better knowledge, deeper insight into the existence and being of things or, objectively expressed, greater significance of the Will, and clearer perception of the existence of things, is the true philosophical aim of Art.

If in this connection the absolute aim of art is sought in other things, as was the case in the popular aesthetics of the preceding century, this, in Schopenhauer's view, is due to the effects of "the arts" being so impressively manifested in practical life, and may so be appraised. But its philosophical aim is to show us the world in visible representations, to bring us nearer the ideas. All demands that are made upon the artist in practical life must be in consonance with the immanent aim. /Inasmuch as art repeats ideas so as to implant them in our knowledge, the paramount norm for the creative artist will be that he shall reproduce the Ideas, true, pure, and unfalsified.) The practical and supreme


⁸² *Ibid.*, vol. I, ch. 36.


⁸³ *Ibid.*, vol. II, ch. 34.

law issuing from the philosophically grounded aim of art is, for the artist, the Truth.

The True is to be considered⁸⁴ as the first and major category, therefore. Schopenhauer requires us to imagine a retrogression to ancient times, when man did not yet separate the true, the good and the beautiful. Such a retrogression, he claims, need involve no mistakes this time: for the purposes of representing the world, with the aim of greater vision for the discerning spirit into the existence thereof, the Truth is a postulate, by and of itself. As science concerns herself with the True, so also does art; except that where the former proves the True, the latter depicts it.

⁸⁴ Schopenhauer did not directly set up Truth as a "category"; but it is presumable from his exposition in the parts quoted herein that he required it to be the major law of Art. Cf. *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, vol. II, ch. 34: "Jedes Kunstwerk ist demgemäss bemueht uns das Leben und die Dinge so zu zeigen, wie sie in Wahrheit sind, aber durch den Nebel objektiver und subjektiver Zufälligkeit hindurch nicht von jedem unmittelbar erfasst werden können; diesen Uebel nimmt die Kunst hinweg."





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